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Introduction 
On December 9, 2015, a consortium of news agencies held a public forum to 
commemorate the one-year anniversary of Detroit’s exit from the largest municipal bankruptcy 
case in United States history. The program included presentations from Michigan Governor 
Rick Snyder, Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes, and the city’s newly elected Mayor, Mike 
Duggan. 
What promised to be an opportunity to hear “key players” discuss the city’s post-
bankruptcy progress was cut short when protestors began to overwhelm the speakers. 
Organizers called out from the audience as Snyder and Rhodes took the stage, expressing anger 
over the cuts to municipal workers’ retiree benefits that resulted from the bankruptcy, and 
denouncing the state’s use of emergency management in Detroit. 
Cries of “liar” punctured a previously upbeat and congratulatory reflection on the 
bankruptcy case. One protester carried a sign that read, “We Have Been Ripped Off.” Another 
shouted at the Governor, “Why is it never a ‘Rick Snyder,’ never the rich people who have to 
pay? It’s always taken out of poor people’s hands.”1 
… 
Detroit is a city known for images of abandonment and ruin. For years, it has served as a 
national symbol of industrial decline, economic disinvestment, and depopulation. The city’s 
deteriorating condition is understood often as the product (or victim) of a new global economy, 
portending the demise of the American industrial worker. Predictably, photographs of 
crumbling manufacturing plants and empty sidewalks accompanied news headlines announcing 
that Detroit had filed for bankruptcy protection. 
Perhaps for this reason, the city’s bankruptcy declaration produced little shock in most 
observers, local or national. The common narrative for the bankruptcy celebrated city and state 
                                               
1 Metro Times, “Audience Calls 'Baloney' on Snyder at WSU Bankruptcy Talk,” YouTube video, 2:38. 
Posted December, 2015. 
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leaders for their fortitude in finally accepting the reality of the city’s fiscal crisis, and praised 
judges for the case’s speed and efficiency. The academic literature on municipal bankruptcy 
reinforces this deterministic view of Detroit’s case, in that legal theorists understand bankruptcy 
as a process that is predominantly controlled and modeled by economic phenomena. 
Specifically, the dominant legal approach conceptualizes bankruptcy as an exercise in economic 
efficiency that maximizes the collective welfare of creditors. 
However, this interpretation of Detroit’s bankruptcy saga as acting out some sort of 
economic or fiscal destiny overlooks many of the questions and tensions evident at the 
bankruptcy’s one-year anniversary event. Was bankruptcy an inevitable outcome for Detroit, as 
Snyder began to suggest in his presentation? Who benefitted from the bankruptcy, who ‘had to 
pay,’ and how were these winners and losers determined? What role did politics play in shaping 
these outcomes? These are the questions I seek to answer in my thesis, and in doing so provide a 
new conceptual approach to municipal bankruptcy as a political, as well as economic, 
phenomenon. 
Research Design 
I began my research by familiarizing myself with the timeline of Detroit’s fiscal crisis and 
bankruptcy. I then identified pivotal moments in the story - when the city made a fateful choice, 
but could have plausibly taken another path - as anchors for my counterfactual analysis. These 
included the city’s decision to declare bankruptcy, as well as the settlement of a number of deals 
that allowed the bankruptcy to move forward. I used legal documents and transcripts from the 
case, along with press reporting and other government materials, to understand how the Detroit 
bankruptcy as we have come to know it emerged and also to analyze distributive implications of 
these outcomes. Finally, I chose to illuminate further the Detroit episode by comparing it 
alongside two other cases of local fiscal distress - New York City in 1975 and Orange County in 
1994. Each had several important features in common with Detroit yet arrived at significantly 
different outcomes. 
3 
 
Overview of Chapters 
In Chapter 1 I will review the literature on inequality and distribution in the United 
States, the political economy of cities, municipal bankruptcy, and judicial decision-making. 
Chapter 2 will provide an overview of how Detroit’s fiscal crisis emerged over the past decades, 
with particular consideration given to the political dynamics that contributed to Detroit’s 
economic decline. This chapter also includes an introduction to the city’s precarious pre-
bankruptcy finances, from its pension funds to its borrowing patterns. I will continue this story 
in Chapter 3, which describes the city’s course from fiscal crisis to and through bankruptcy. 
Once I have familiarized the reader with my case, I will provide a distributional analysis 
of the Detroit’s bankruptcy. In particular, I will analyze the distributional consequences of 
crucial political conflicts and their resolution during the bankruptcy process. Chapter 4 will 
begin with an analysis of the decision, by state and city officials, to declare bankruptcy in 
response to the city’s fiscal crisis. I will then analyze the deals produced during bankruptcy, 
including the so-called “grand bargain,” the formation of the Great Lakes Water Authority, and 
the city’s settlements with its various financial creditors. Finally, in Chapter 5, I will use New 
York City’s 1975 fiscal crisis and Orange County’s 1994 bankruptcy to provide a comparative 
study of the Detroit case that both emphasizes and expands my analysis from Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
In this chapter, I will review three areas of scholarly research that contextualize my own 
work. The first section includes a discussion of recent scholarship on the politics of economic 
distribution and inequality at the national level. I then move to the literature on the political 
economy of cities, focusing in particular on the dynamics that affect local budgets. Finally, I will 
conclude with an overview of the legal scholarship on municipal bankruptcy and judicial 
decision making.  
Inequality and Economic Distribution in the U.S. 
Coinciding with the steady rise in economic inequality since the 1980s, there is a growing 
body of academic work addressing the failure of the American political system to redistribute 
wealth and income on a federal level. Public choice models of political behavior support the 
intuition that economic inequality of the kind currently observed in the U.S., characterized by a 
widening gap between the rich and the rest of the country, will prompt an increasing 
redistribution of resources by majoritarian democratic governments. Downs’ model predicts 
that vote-maximizing politicians in two-party systems have rational incentives to align their 
party platforms with the preferences of the median voter, and that policy outcomes in these 
systems should therefore reflect the median voter’s preferences.2 Applying Downs’ model to 
redistributive policies in particular, Meltzer and Richard theorize that a majoritarian democracy 
will generate redistribution whenever the mean income is greater than the median income (that 
is, the income of the median voter).3 This model would suggest that inequality and the demand 
for redistribution are positively linked, and that higher levels of inequality should lead to a 
greater level of redistribution.  
                                               
2
 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957). 
3
 Allan Meltzer and Scott Richards, “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government,” Journal of Political 
Economy 89, no. 5 (1981): 914-927. 
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There are two major challenges to the public choice model of redistribution that attempt 
to explain why the American political reality diverges from theoretical predictions. One sub-
genre of the literature on redistribution in the United States questions the model’s assumption 
that people who are disadvantaged by inequality will necessarily prefer redistributive policies. 
On the contrary, recent empirical studies suggest that inequality tends to promote fiscal 
conservatism. A study by Kelly and Enns models the effect of inequality on preferences while 
controlling for other theoretically relevant variables, ultimately finding that all classes in the 
United States become more conservative as the level of inequality increases.4 Lupu and 
Pontusson, in a similar study, find that the structure of inequality is more relevant than the level 
of inequality, but nevertheless corroborate the negative correlation between inequality and 
support for redistribution.5 Luttig confirms the results of both Kelly-Enns and Lupu-Pontusson, 
arguing that both the absolute level and the changing structure of inequality have promoted 
conservatism.6  
There is also a significant body of literature which seeks to explain the results of these 
empirical studies and to understand American policy preferences. One explanation put forth by 
Kearns et al, for example, looks at the residential and spatial determinants of public support for 
redistribution.7 The researchers ask whether where someone lives is associated with their 
attitudes on inequality and income redistribution. They find that people with higher incomes 
showed greater support for redistribution when they lived in areas that were more deprived, had 
a higher density, and were more ethnically mixed. Patterns of residence, therefore, can be said 
to reinforce patterns of income and wealth inequalities through public opinion. 
                                               
4
 Nathan Kelly and Peter Enns, “Inequality and the Dynamics of Public Opinion: The Self-Reinforcing 
Link Between Economic Inequality and Mass Preferences,” American Journal of Political Science 54, no. 
4 (2010): 855–70. 
5
 Noam Lupu and Jonas Pontusson, “The Structure of Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution,” 
American Political Science Review 105, no. 2 (2011): 316–36. 
6
 Matthew Luttig, “The Structure of Inequality and Americans’ Attitudes Toward Redistribution,” Public 
Opinion Quarterly 77, no. 3 (2013): 811–21. 
7
 Nick Bailey et al, “‘All in It Together’? Social Cohesion in a Divided Society: Attitudes to Income 
Inequality and Redistribution in a Residential Context,” Journal of Social Policy 43, no. 3 (2014): 453–77. 
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Alesina and Glaesar argue the history of race and racism in the United States is a key 
determinant of American attitudes towards redistribution.8 In their discussion of race, Alesina 
and Glaesar argue that the historic overlap between race and class in the United States has made 
it easier for politicians to stigmatize the poor as inherently “different” or “lesser” in order to 
avoid redistributive policies. Jacobs and Helms, like Alesina and Glaesar, focus on race in the 
United States in their explanation for the lack of redistribution.9 Specifically, through analyzing 
"historically contingent" changes in the progressivity of United States income tax code, they find 
that civil rights activity leads to redistributive tax policies, but social problems blamed on the 
underclass – such as riots or crime – reduce the progressivity of the tax code.  
Other authors, such as Bartels, speculate that problems of information and voter 
competency are at fault.10 Bartels uses Bush Era Tax Cuts as a case study of the “irrationality” of 
American voters, focusing in particular on the disconnect between voters’ ideological values 
relating to the economy and their support for this specific tax policy, as well as the general 
latitude such disconnects afford political elites. Why is it, he asks, that middle and lower class 
voters who oppose inequality and believe the wealthy are not taxed enough supported the Bush 
Tax Cuts - which many of the same voters acknowledged would disproportionately benefit the 
wealthy? Bartels’ solution – that “the appealing notion of popular sovereignty is both 
psychologically unrealistic and logically incoherent” – is two-part: first, many voters simply 
ignored the issue; second, those who had an opinion based their views on their own tax cut over 
their larger economic interest and values. Bartels concludes that public opinion is not an 
impetus for redistributive policies, but rather a political resource to be shaped. 
                                               
8
 Alberto Alesina and Edward Glaeser, Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A World of Difference 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
9
 David Jacobs and Ronald Helms, “Racial Politics and Redistribution: Isolating the Contingent Influence 
of Civil Rights, Riots, and Crime on Tax Progressivity,” Social Forces 80, no. 1 (2001): 91–121. 
10
 Larry Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2009). 
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There is a second set of criticisms of the public choice approach to redistribution which 
questions whether the traditional median voter model is a useful representation of the American 
political system. An article by Brady, Verba, and Schlozman uses survey data on electoral 
participation through voting, campaign work, and campaign contributions to adapt Downs' 
portrait of the median voter.11 They find that the Downsian Model is predictive when the median 
voter is defined by relative political participation, as well as ideology. This is due to the practical 
necessities of running and funding campaigns which encourage candidates to be more 
responsive to those voters who are more likely to volunteer their time or donate. Rational 
politicians, therefore, attempt to woo voters who are more politically active, as well as the 
ideological centrist, and thus do not converge precisely on the ideologically median voter, but 
preference more active citizens. Because income levels are higher for participators than for the 
general population, they argue, politicians will favor policies that are minimally redistributive. 
Hacker and Pierson argue that prevailing political theories focus too narrowly on tax 
policy and the median voter; they instead advocate an analysis focused on organized group 
influence on the “market conditioning” policies of the government through lobbying 
efforts.12 Hacker and Pierson rely on the concept of political "drift" and its role in this process. 
They define drift as the failure of politicians to update policies due to pressure from political 
interest groups, despite the recognition that the effect of these policies has changed substantially 
due to shifts in surrounding economic or social contexts, "drifting" away from their original 
intent. Encouraging political drift, they argue, is a key way American legislative institutions are 
shaped in ways that give unequal influence to business interests, resist redistribution, and allow 
inequality to rise. 
                                               
11
 Henry Brady, Sidney Verba, and Kay Schlozman, “Redistribution, Polarization, and Medians: Bringing 
Data to Downsian Puzzles,” Conference Papers - American Political Science Association, January 2009, 
1-52. 
12
 Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, “Presidents and the Political Economy: The Coalitional Foundations of 
Presidential Power,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 42, no. 1 (2012): 101–31. 
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A study by Gilens and Page builds on Hacker and Pierson’s thesis, testing the policy 
influence of different actors in the American system with a single statistical model, using 
multivariate analysis to demonstrate that economic elites and organized groups representing 
business interests have significant independent influence on American policy, while average 
citizens and their mass-based interest groups have little to none.13 Gilens and Page look at key 
variables for 1,779 policy issues, relating group preference on different policies to the success 
rate of said policies (whether or not the proposed policy change occurred in four years). This 
relationship is expressed through a "predictor," which measures the influence of group 
preference on outcome on a scale of 0 to 1; for average citizens, this number was 0.05, whereas 
for business interest groups it was 0.43 and for economic elites it was 0.78. Based on this 
evidence, Gilens and Page conclude that both economic elites and organized interest groups play 
a substantial part in affecting US policy, whereas the general public has little to no independent 
influence. 
Political Economy of Cities 
The body of work described thus far holds important insights into the political factors 
that shape economic distribution in America; however, it focuses exclusively on federal policy. 
Studies of redistribution at the local level account for not only the role of electoral systems in 
shaping fiscal policy (as modeled by Downs and Meltzer and Richards) but also for the effect of 
voter and taxpayer mobility on these outcomes. As Tiebout first theorized in 1956, the ease with 
which residents can move between cities (at least relative to international mobility) should lead 
to preference-based sorting of residents and efficiency-producing competition among cities.14  
According to the Tiebout model, local redistribution will theoretically create a problem of 
adverse selection wherein wealthy individuals leave the municipality and are replaced by poorer 
                                               
13
 Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page, “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and 
Average Citizens,” Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 3 (2014): 564-581. 
14
 Charles Tiebout, “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,” Journal of Political Economy 64, no. 5  
(1956): 416-424. 
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residents, shrinking the overall funds available for redistribution.15 Peterson extends Tiebout’s 
argument to the business sector as well, demonstrating that analogous dynamics affect the 
movement of firms and capital from cities, with serious implications for a local tax revenue and 
employment.16 Thus, local governments are heavily reliant on state and federal levels of 
government for redistributive policies and transfers. Cities as economic entities are therefore 
deeply vulnerable and responsive not only to the preferences of residents and interest groups, 
but also to the policies enacted at higher levels of government.  
Kantor and David argue that the municipal budgetary arena, specifically, is used as a 
means to generate political stability and dissuade relocation of residents and business. Their 
analysis suggest that city budgets should be expected to transform significantly in response to 
changing constraints (both exogenous and endogenous) in urban political and economic 
development.17 This responsiveness, they argue, accounts for the recent volatility in city 
budgeting, characterized by fiscal crises, illegal deficits, severe retrenchment, and emergency 
bailouts.  
Peck builds on Kantor and David’s analytic framework, looking at how the exogenous 
factor of the 2008 financial crisis was translated into a state crisis, especially at the urban 
scale.18 He describes a rise in ‘austerity politics,’ defined as a sustained federal effort to socialize, 
rescale, and 'dump' costs of the economic crisis onto states and cities, remaking the landscapes 
of urban politics. In particular, Peck identifies a key tension causing strain on states and cities: 
that the commitment to public services in the United States is almost entirely delivered at the 
state or local level, while a neoliberal platform at the federal level pushes restraints on social 
spending and developing government employment, devolving budgets, and deferring to market 
                                               
15
 Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution and Local Democracy: Interest Groups and the Courts (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2011). 
16
 Paul Peterson, City Limits (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). 
17
 Paul Kantor and Stephen David, “The Political Economy of Change in Urban Budgetary Politics: A 
Framework for Analysis and a Case Study,” British Journal of Political Science 13, no. 3 (1983): 251–74. 
18
 Jamie Peck “Pushing Austerity: State Failure, Municipal Bankruptcy and the Crises of Fiscal Federalism 
in the USA,” Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy & Society 7, no. 1 (2014): 17–44. 
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conditions. This creates, he argues, cyclical financial distress. Budget crises trickle down while at 
the same time balanced-budget requirements are placed on states and cities, localizing budget 
pressure. In response, most local bodies are forced to reduce services and retrench public-sector 
workers. Ultimately, he argues, this system is self-perpetuating because deficit conditions 
systematically favor anti-state forces. 
Other scholars focus on endogenous forces within cities, examining how the political 
pressure exerted by interest groups generates budgetary instability. Many focus on the threat of 
underfunded pensions as an engine of the fiscal crises facing many local political bodies.19 
Kelley, for example, uses three models to examine the problem of underfunded pensions: the 
ubiquitous Downsian Model, the theory of “capture” by special interest groups, and a hybrid of 
the two.20 Using data from the Public Pension Database on pension liabilities and assets, he 
compares these points to voter data (income, age) and interest statistics (public union percent of 
voting population).  The median voter, he speculates, would want to push the costs to the future, 
and the "special interests" - the public sector unions - would want to maximize the short-term 
compensation packages. Kelley ultimately finds that the combined model provides the strongest 
explanation, suggesting both voter preferences and interest groups affect outcomes.  
Municipal Bankruptcy in Legal Theory 
In thinking about the relevant phenomena covered thus far - public opinion, interest 
groups, institutions, and fiscal federalism - it is useful to consider how these factors interact as a 
city moves from fiscal crisis to bankruptcy. Gillette argues that distressed municipalities take a 
strategic approach to the two options available to them: either to receive a bailout from central 
                                               
19
 Robert Novy-Marx and Joshua Rauh, “The Liabilities and Risks of State-Sponsored Pension Plans,” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 23, no. 4 (2009): 191–210. 
20
 Dashle Kelley, “The Political Economy of Unfunded Public Pension Liabilities,” Public Choice 158, no. 
1–2 (2014): 21–38. 
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government (state or federal) or declare bankruptcy.21 Central governments, he reasons, will try 
to avoid the negative externalities resulting from one municipality’s bankruptcy within the 
regional economy, and will therefore step in to bail out distressed cities, often attaching some 
form of oversight or “repayment” agreement to these bailouts. Gillette argues that city officials 
who understand the central government’s fear of bankruptcy “contagion” could theoretically 
threaten bankruptcy to negotiate more favorable conditions to their bailouts.  
Moringiello understands the decision to declare municipal bankruptcy not as strategic 
behavior but rather as the bringing together of two sovereigns, the state and the federal 
government, to accomplish something that neither could accomplish on its own: developing a 
plan to adjust debts that is binding to all creditors.22 Moringiello argues that bankruptcy is a 
“wake-up call” to state officials to address deficiencies in their municipal distress intervention 
policies. He argues that recent bankruptcy filings in the U.S. challenge the conventional wisdom 
that municipal bankruptcy is poorly tailored to the rehabilitation needs of cities, arguing that 
approaches like Gillette’s are flawed because they looked at state intervention in municipal 
affairs and bankruptcy as freestanding alternatives rather than complementary components of a 
comprehensive recovery plan.   
Judicial Decision Making 
Because bankruptcy judges are often granted significant power in shaping bankruptcy 
outcomes, a brief discussion of judicial decision making is relevant. Much of this literature uses 
either a “behavioral” model to assess the impact of judges’ personal attributes and backgrounds 
on their decision making, or an “attitudinal” model to argue that it is the judge's ideology which 
                                               
21
 Clayton Gillette, "Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy," The 
University of Chicago Law Review 79, no.1 283 (2012): 281-330. 
22
 Juliet Moringiello, “Goals and Governance in Municipal Bankruptcy,” Washington and Lee Law 
Review 71, no. 1 (2014). 
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influences their choices.23 Collins builds from this attitudinal framework, exploring how a 
judge’s ideology combines with external political factors to produce outcomes.24 Using evidence 
from amicus curiae briefs, he propose a new “Legal Persuasion Model,” which predicts that a 
judge will be influenced by the ideological content of legal briefs in a case irrespective of his or 
her own political proclivity.  
Rather than studying judges as individuals, the decision-making scholarship on 
bankruptcy proceedings in particular has largely attempted to analyze the welfare 
considerations implicit in bankruptcy law, which judges are presumed to embody. Jackson and 
Scott, for example, propose a model that is both descriptive and normative, which suggests that 
the various objectives which shape the distributional goals of bankruptcy are consistent with the 
goal of maximizing expected creditor group welfare.25 In order to do this, judges must 
understand distributional effects of bankruptcy as a "bankruptcy tax" imposed upon creditors in 
the collective proceedings, which must be fixed and horizontally equitable to avoid collective 
action problems. Korobkin disputes Jackson and Scott’s welfare-based theory of bankruptcy, 
arguing that bankruptcy law does not merely exist for the purpose of maximizing the economic 
welfare of creditors as a group.26 Rather, he argues, it is a response to a crisis of diverse human 
values that cannot be reduced to the objectivity and certainty of economic models. Korobkin 
proposes that bankruptcy decision making be understood as analogous to individual decision 
making about a person's life in that the normative and deliberative constraints of bankruptcy 
law allow judges to make rational decisions within the complex context of the case. 
                                               
23
 Michael Heise, "The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision 
Making and the New Empiricism" (2002), Cornell Law Faculty Publications, Paper 733. 
24
 Paul Collins Jr, Friends of the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and Judicial Decision Making (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008.) 
25
 Thomas H. Jackson and Robert E. Scott, “On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy 
Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain,” Virginia Law Review 75, no. 2 (1989). 
26
 Donald Korobkin, “Value and Rationality in Bankruptcy Decisionmaking,” William & Mary Law 
Review 33, no. 2 (1992): 333-336. 
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In this chapter, I have reviewed scholarly work related to my case, moving from research 
focused on the dynamics of national inequality and economic distribution to a discussion of 
local government fiscal crises. I have also provided an introduction to the legal theory on 
municipal bankruptcy and judicial decision making. In Chapter 4, I will return to my discussion 
of bankruptcy theory, situating my distributional analysis within this literature. Before I revisit 
that discussion, I will first introduce my case in greater detail in Chapter 2 and provide an 
overview of Detroit’s fiscal crisis and bankruptcy in Chapter 3. 
 
  
14 
 
Chapter 2: Detroit’s Fiscal Crisis 
“It is, indeed, a momentous day,”27 Judge Rhodes told the courtroom on December 3, 
2013, as he announced his decision to allow Detroit to enter bankruptcy protection. Rhodes 
continued, “we have here a judicial finding that this once proud and prosperous city can't pay its 
debts. It's insolvent.”28  
… 
In order to contextualize my analysis of the response to Detroit’s fiscal crisis, I will first 
briefly address the question of how this crisis came to be. Specifically, in this chapter I will 
present the politics and policies that led to Detroit’s declines and brought a “once proud and 
prosperous city” to the point where it could no longer pay its debts, let alone provide basic city 
services to its citizens. 
Historians trace the origins of Detroit’s economic decline - which in turn precipitated its 
fiscal crisis - to prewar years, when racial discrimination in housing and employment created a 
precarious foundation upon which the city grew rapidly.29 Discrimination in the housing market 
forced new black migrants of the Great Migration into the city's worst and most congested 
housing stock.30 Not long after, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) developed 
mortgage-backing policies that entrenched patterns of segregation by funneling federal 
investment in homeownership into homogeneous white neighborhoods. By the 1940s, the 
segregation machine of Detroit, codified in federal policy and reinforced by organized racial 
discrimination among realtors and homeowners, insured that residential integration was met 
                                               
27
 In re City of Detroit, Case No. 13-53846 (Bankruptcy E.D. Mich. 2013), Docket No. 1947: Judge Rhodes 
Bench Opinion Regarding Eligibility, page 55. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Kevin Boyle, "The Ruins of Detroit: Exploring the Urban Crisis in the Motor City,” Michigan Historical 
Review 27, no. 1 (2001): 109-127. George Galster, Driving Detroit: The Quest for Respect in the Motor 
City, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012). Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban 
Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2014). June Manning Thomas, Redevelopment and Race: Planning a Finer 
City in Postwar Detroit (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2013). 
30
 Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis, 34-55. 
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with patterns of declining home values and neighborhood demographic turnover.31 Black 
Detroiters also faced obstacles in the labor market, where they were confined to the worst, 
lowest paying industrial jobs.32 
Over the course of the following decades, twin forces of deindustrialization and 
suburbanization began to transform intra-city inequality into regional inequality. The process of 
Northern urban deindustrialization began during World War Two, when the federal government 
invested considerably in industrial growth outside city centers, believing suburban areas to be 
less vulnerable to enemy attacks.33 Sunbelt politicians worked to maintain this trend as they 
gained power in the postwar years, steering government investment in industry toward their 
states and away from northern cities like Detroit.34  
Private manufacturers soon followed suit, relocating to areas, such as the South or 
suburbs, with lower wages and more favorable labor relations.35 At the same time, the 
automation of manufacturing processes eliminated many of the jobs to which black workers 
were confined. However, as a result of persistent housing discrimination in the suburbs, these 
workers were not able to follow remaining employment as it began to relocate outside of the city. 
The residential exclusion of black residents from areas of economic growth and prosperity 
continued to shape inequality in the metro-Detroit region for the remainder of the century. 
  In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the city’s cross-racial alliance of liberal political and 
labor leaders sought to make Detroit a center of “Great Society” social policy.36 However, 
Detroit’s economic destabilization soon translated into increased political fragmentation. 
Despite its enthusiasm for liberal policy reform, the coalition ultimately failed to change 
institutional structures of racial oppression. Discrimination in employment and housing, as well 
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as issues of police brutality, remained unresolved.37 As a result, rising racial tension within the 
city percolated until the violent rebellions of 1967. 
The 1967 rebellion accelerated the process of “white flight” in Detroit, further signaling 
the collapse of the city’s cross-racial liberal coalition. Black liberal leaders, however, retained 
much of their political power, and continued to build a solid electorate among the city’s black 
middle class in the midst of white migration from the city. The election of Detroit’s first black 
mayor, Coleman A. Young, in 1973 - just six years after the rebellion - represented a major 
victory for black political power in the city.38 
Mayor Young’s legacy within the metro-Detroit region is ambiguous. He is often 
criticized, for example, for his tendency to make inflammatory comments directed at the 
suburbs, which deepened political cleavages between the increasingly black city and its 
increasingly white metropolitan surroundings.39 (These comments were certainly matched by 
incendiary remarks from suburban political leaders, such as Dearborn Mayor Orville Hubbard 
and Oakland County executive Brooks Patterson.)40  
It is also true that Detroit continued to experience trends of job loss and 
deindustrialization during Young’s tenure, producing deep economic decline. Technological 
advancements in transportation and communication further spurred the movement of 
manufacturing industries from cities like Detroit, contributing to the decline in income and 
property values in the city.41 Between 1977 and 1982, for example, the city experienced a 21% 
loss in industrial operations.42 On a regional scale, manufacturing jobs were replaced with 
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suburban service-sector employment, but residential segregation proved a geographical obstacle 
between Detroiters and these jobs. 
Mayor Young attempted to counter Detroit’s manufacturing downturn by encouraging 
corporate investment in the city’s central business district. At this point, government-business 
coordination had deteriorated from a relatively stable coalition in the 1940s-1960s into a 
“vendor regime.”  Under this system, business interests proposed economic development 
projects which the city administration made concessions to facilitate.43 Due to Detroit’s 
vulnerable economic position, these projects usually came at a cost to the city in terms of land 
write-downs as well as tax abatements and incentives.  
  Despite the economic challenges his administration faced, Mayor Young managed to 
maintain a balanced budget throughout much of his tenure through a combination of budget 
cuts and government downsizing. When the nationwide recession of the late 1970s pushed the 
city to the edge of fiscal crisis in 1981, Young successfully addressed the nearly $132.6 million 
deficit through a series of political maneuvers.44 Most notably, he convinced Detroit residents to 
vote for a local income tax increase and negotiated a wage decrease from fifty two of the city’s 
fifty-seven unions. Young’s management of the situation allowed the city to maintain its 
independence from external financial control. 
In the decades after Young left office, Detroit’s finances suffered from a combination of 
dwindling revenue and increased spending obligations. These fiscal stresses evolved in part from 
the economic trends that continued to affect Detroit, including poor employment conditions and 
a shrinking population. However, political decisions, in both local and state government, also 
worsened Detroit’s financial position. 
Funds from each of Detroit's major sources of tax revenue - property, income, utility 
user, and casino-wagering taxes - all declined steadily from the late 1990s through the 2010s as 
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the city’s economy deteriorated.45 Detroit also lost a significant amount of revenue due to 
continued cuts in the state’s revenue sharing program. These cuts were partly according to the 
state’s revenue sharing algorithm, which decreased funds with Detroit's population, yet much of 
the reduction was discretionary.46  
In 1998, then-Mayor Dennis Archer attempted to plug this leak in the city’s revenue 
stream through a “handshake deal” with Governor John Engler. According to the deal, Detroit 
would reduce its income tax in exchange for a guaranteed $339 million in revenue sharing 
payments from the state.47 Despite this agreement, the state nevertheless continued to cut funds 
to the city throughout the following decades. By some estimates, this deal cost Detroit as much 
as $728 million by 2013 - $220 million in owed revenue sharing payments and $508 in lost 
income tax revenue.48  
Detroit's finances also suffered from the legacy costs49 of the city’s retiree benefit 
obligations and other promised post-employment benefits (OPEB). The city operated two 
retirement systems funds: the General Retirement System (GRS) and the Police and Fire 
Retirement System (PFRS). Per these systems, each municipal employee automatically 
transferred a portion of their earnings toward retirement income and benefits via a common 
pool investment fund. Both of Detroit’s retirement systems were designed in the mid-20th 
century and promised retirees “defined benefit plans,” which guaranteed retirees a certain level 
of benefits regardless of the financial status of the retirement fund. This meant that the city was 
obligated to make regular contributions to the fund, as well as manage investment decisions, 
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assume market risk, and make up any differences that arose when the fund was insufficient to 
pay retiree benefits.50 
When an employer fails to make financial contributions to its retirement fund to close 
gaps between the fund’s balance and promised benefits, the retirement system is considered 
“underfunded.” Detroit found itself in this position often throughout the second half of the 20th 
century. Underfunding was a frequent issue for Detroit in part because, as the city’s population 
dwindled and its workforce shrank, the ratio of employees paying into the fund versus retirees 
claiming benefits became less and less favorable.51 Larger, national economic trends also played 
a role in exacerbating Detroit’s underfunding problem. For instance, fluctuations in the stock 
market affected the stability of public retirement funds like Detroit’s, which held considerable 
investment portfolios.52 
Certain specific features of Detroit’s retirement systems and the way they were managed 
also contributed to underfunding. For example, until 2011, retirees were able to exchange 
annuity payments from the fund for one lump-sum payment, which drained the system 
significantly in the short-run.53 During the 2000s, the funds engaged in a number of risky, 
ultimately costly investments. The funds’ chief legal counsel and former trustees were eventually 
indicted in March of 2013 on charges of bribery and conspiracy involving more than $200 
million in investments for Detroit’s two retirement funds.54  
By the time Detroit declared bankruptcy in 2013, Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr 
reported that the city’s retirement systems had accumulated $3.5 billion in underfunded 
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pension liabilities.55 However, the larger source of Detroit’s retiree-related debt was not the 
pensions but growing OPEB costs, particularly health care. By 2013, the city estimated these 
debts numbered $6.4 billion.56 There are two reasons why Detroit’s OPEB debts eclipsed its 
pension obligations. First, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) does not 
require local governments to fund their OPEB shortfalls the way they do pension shortfalls.57 
This has led many cities like Detroit to allow underfunding liabilities from OPEB expenses to 
outpace those associated with pensions. Second, the costs of healthcare in the United States rose 
steadily from the 1960s onward, growing the amount that Detroit was required to pay towards 
retiree health care.58 
In this context, it is unsurprising that the city began to run chronic deficits, which city 
officials responded to by selling municipal bonds. These bonds took two forms: general 
obligation and revenue bonds. The city used its taxing power or “good faith and credit” to back 
general obligation bonds, which were regulated by laws designed to limit local governments 
from accumulating large amounts of debt. Revenues from particular projects or special funds, 
such as the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD), served as collateral for Detroit’s 
revenue bonds.  
Under the mayoral leadership of Kwame Kilpatrick, Detroit also employed more unusual 
methods of borrowing, including the quasi-legal “swaps and COPS” deal of 2005. To address 
accrued liabilities and pension debt, the city generated a revenue stream supported by service 
contracts between itself and nonprofit “shell” corporations associated with each of the two 
retirement systems. Municipal bond insurance firms, namely Syncora Holdings AG and 
Financial Guarantee Insurance Co. (FGIC), purchased Certificates of Participation (COPs) in the 
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revenue stream in exchange for paying $1.4 billion to fully fund the city’s pensions. This 
complicated transaction allowed the city to circumvent legal limits on municipal borrowing and 
source additional money to pay its pension obligations.  
The second component of the deal involved Detroit’s “swaps bet.” Two banks, UBS and 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch (BOA-ML), agreed to convert floating interest rates on some of 
the new COP debt to a fixed interest rate. Per this agreement, Detroit paid a fixed rate to UBS 
and BOA-ML, and in exchange the banks paid Detroit the variable rates.59 By taking this deal, 
the city effectively bet that interest rates would rise or stay above the fixed amount. Riskier still, 
Detroit agreed to a stipulation that gave the banks the ability to demand the entire projected 
future value of the swaps deal in “termination payments” should the city’s credit rating fall even 
one level. 
Detroit’s problems, both economic and financial, became even more severe during and 
immediately after the Great Recession of 2008. Interest rates fell significantly due to efforts by 
the Federal Reserve to offset the effects of the recession, and it soon became clear that the city 
had lost its swaps wager as its debts to the UBS and BOA-ML crept into the hundreds of 
millions. Mayor Ken Cockrel, Jr. negotiated a new deal in 2009 to avoid triggering the automatic 
termination of the swaps when the city’s credit rating fell. Cockrel pledged casino tax revenue as 
collateral on the swaps debt,60 which converted the swaps into “secured” obligations that could 
not be altered through financial restructuring or bankruptcy.61 
Detroit’s economic position during these years was similarly unfavorable. Between 2008 
and 2010, unemployment in Detroit effectively doubled, and property taxes decreased by 19.7% 
as a result of plummeting value assessments.62 The recession also cut into key income tax 
                                               
59
 Chung, “Government Budgets,” 2014. 
60
 Reuters, “Swaps Deal Will Save Detroit From Insolvency: Mayor,” April 13, 2009.  
61
 Chung, “Government Budgets,” 2014. 
62
 City of Detroit, “Proposal for Creditors,” June 14, 2013. 
22 
 
revenues and fee revenues from city-operated utilities.63 And, while Detroit’s resources declined 
rapidly during this time, the city had virtually no borrowing options owing both to its poor credit 
rating and to the fact that it had run up against many state-imposed limits of local government 
borrowing.64 In the end, the city found itself with no choice but to further reduce spending on 
already diminished city services. 
By 2013, Judge Rhodes summarized Detroit’s situation with a grim set of statistics. The 
city’s population was less than 700,000 - a 63% drop from its postwar peak and a 26% drop 
since 2000. Detroit’s violent crime rate was five times the national average and its 
unemployment rate came in at over 18%.  In 2013, the average emergency response time for the 
Police Department was 58 minutes, compared to a national average of 11 minutes. 
Approximately 40% of the city’s streetlights did not work. The city had accumulated as much as 
$18 billion in debt, owed to more than 100,000 creditors.65 However, while these statistics are 
certainly jarring, they do not in themselves explain how Detroit came to declare bankruptcy. The 
next chapter provides an introduction to my answer to this question, as well as an overview of 
the city’s bankruptcy proceedings. 
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Chapter 3: Timeline of Detroit’s Bankruptcy66 
In the previous chapter, I explained how Detroit’s fiscal crisis came to be; here, I provide 
an overview of how that crisis resulted in bankruptcy. This chapter also includes an overview of 
the bankruptcy itself, from the initial filing to the confirmation of the final Plan of Adjustment. 
In Chapter 4, I will return to the most important events in greater detail - my intention here is to 
provide the reader with a sense of where those events fit into the overall saga of Detroit’s 
bankruptcy. 
The story of how, in 2013, Detroit’s economic and financial trajectory arrived at 
bankruptcy is closely tied with the development of the State of Michigan’s institution of 
emergency management. Michigan’s emergency manager laws first appeared in 1990, under the 
leadership of Governor James Blanchard (D).67 The original law, known as the “Local 
Government Fiscal Responsibility Act,” allowed the State to intervene in the governing affairs of 
municipalities and school districts facing financial crises by appointing an emergency financial 
manager. These managers assumed many of the financial decision-making powers typically held 
by elected officials. Both Democratic and Republican governors appointed emergency financial 
managers throughout the 1990s and 2010s. 
Early in Governor Snyder’s first term, the Michigan legislature replaced the original 
emergency manager law with Public Act 4 of 2011, which expanded the position considerably. 
Under this law, state-appointed managers had powers that in many ways assumed and exceeded 
the role of elected officials.68 The most controversial of these included the ability to adopt new 
local legislation, the right to remove elected and appointed officials from office, and the legal 
authority to alter and void union contracts. 
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In November of the same year, Governor Snyder announced that he would appoint a ten 
member panel to assess Detroit’s financial situation. This announcement attracted particular 
attention because Public Act 4 named the formation of such a “review team” as the preliminary 
step in the emergency management process.69 City leaders, including then-Mayor Dave Bing and 
Council President Charles Pough responded that they were optimistic that the city’s financial 
problems could be addressed through negotiations with unions to make “structural reforms” in 
health care and pensions, as well as wage reductions.70  
Following the financial review team’s determination that the city was in a state of 
financial emergency, Detroit officials approved a “Financial Stability Agreement” in 2012. This 
agreement, which City Council approved by a slim 5-4 majority, handed over operating and 
budgeting control to a state-appointed review board, but allowed local officials to retain their 
other powers.71 
Later that year, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees 
(AFSCME) successfully led an effort to repeal Public Act 4 through a statewide voter 
referendum. The AFSCME consortium represented several public sector unions whose pension 
plans would soon be labeled key elements of the city’s fiscal crisis. In December of 2012, the 
Republican-dominated State Legislature enacted another law that essentially re-instituted the 
most controversial elements of Public Act 4, including giving emergency managers powers of 
legislation and contract alteration.72 
In March of 2013, just months after signing this new law into effect, Governor Snyder 
placed Detroit under emergency management and selected Kevyn Orr, a top bankruptcy lawyer, 
to serve as manager. Workers, retirees, and the city’s two pension funds responded by filing 
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multiple lawsuits to block the state government from authorizing a bankruptcy in Detroit.73 Orr 
himself made early remarks that he would try to avoid bankruptcy through “good faith” 
negotiations with creditors. However, just days after the media began reporting tensions in 
these negotiations, Orr filed for chapter 9 bankruptcy protection on behalf of the city on July 
18th, 2013.74 
The United States Bankruptcy Court quickly appointed Judge Rhodes to adjudicate the 
case, and in September Rhodes began the city’s eligibility hearings. In order to be considered 
eligible for chapter 9 bankruptcy protection, a city must meet at least three of the following four 
requirements: (1) the city must have an agreement on a plan from creditors holding at least a 
majority in amount of claims under each class on which the municipality intends to impair debt; 
(2) the city must have attempted to negotiate in “good faith” with creditors, but failed to reach 
an agreement; (3) this failure - that is, the inability of the city to negotiate with creditors - must 
be because such negotiations are impracticable; and (4) the city must reasonably believe that a 
creditor will try to obtain a “preferential payment” of municipal assets through aggressive 
bargaining.75 
During eligibility hearings, Detroit’s unions objected to the city’s chapter 9 filing on the 
grounds that Orr had not genuinely pursued good faith negotiations with their representatives, 
and had instead predetermined the city would file bankruptcy. A number of additional 
challenges arose during this period on the legality of altering union negotiations under 
bankruptcy. Perhaps the most important of these challenges came from Michigan Attorney 
General Bill Schuette, who made official statements during the hearings that Michigan’s 
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constitution protected the integrity of union contracts, which could not legally be “diminished or 
impaired” by the bankruptcy process.76 
In the midst of Detroit’s eligibility hearings, Orr pursued an agreement with UBS and 
BOA-ML to settle the city’s interest rate swaps debt from 2005. This included an estimated 
$350-400 million payment from the city and promised future tax revenue flows from Detroit’s 
casinos, which represented 20% of the city’s total revenue.77 Judge Rhodes rejected this iteration 
of the deal between Detroit and UBS/BOA-ML on the grounds that it gave too generous 
compensation to the banks given that the 2005 swaps were potentially illegal.78 
In December of 2013, Judge Rhodes ruled Detroit eligible for chapter 9 bankruptcy, and 
opined that the city had made “good faith” efforts to negotiate with creditors prior to filing for 
bankruptcy protection. Perhaps most importantly, Rhodes argued that retirement obligations 
could be altered in federal bankruptcy court. 
In the same months as the city edged towards bankruptcy, controversy emerged around 
the prospect of the city’s selling artwork from the Detroit Institute of Arts (DIA) to repay 
creditors. Although Schuette testified during the eligibility hearings that DIA works were legally 
protected from such sales, several creditor groups began to organize around the prospect of 
liquidation.79 Orr and his legal team contracted the international auction house Christie’s 
Appraisals to assess the value of the collections, which it placed somewhere between $452 and 
$866 million.80 Once Judge Gerald Rosen was named lead mediator for Detroit’s case, he began 
meetings with various philanthropies and foundations to try to solicit money to protect the 
artwork.  
                                               
76
 Susan Kelly, “Michigan Attorney General Backs Pensioners in Detroit Bankruptcy,” Reuters, June 27, 
2013.  
77
 Turbeville, “Detroit Bankruptcy,” 16.  
78
 Nathan Bomey, "Rhodes Halts Trial over Swaps Deal, Orders City to Renegotiate with Banks," Detroit 
Free Press, December 18, 2013. 
79
 Mark Stryker, "Orr's Office Hires Auction House Christie's to Take 2nd Look at DIA's Art," Detroit Free 
Press, August 5, 2013.  
80
 Randy Kennedy, “Christie’s Reveals Detroit Art Appraisal,” New York Times, December 4, 2013. 
27 
 
In January of 2014, Judge Rosen announced his “grand bargain,” an agreement that 
protected DIA artwork from liquidation in exchange for a multi-million dollar contribution to 
retiree pension funds.81 This contribution included $100 million from private DIA donors, $330 
million from philanthropic foundations, and $350 million from the State. The city then 
transferred the artwork to a charitable trust, where it would be shielded from creditors. 
The next month, Detroit released the first version of its “Plan of Adjustment” of debts, 
which the city would continue to revise in the following months as it negotiated with its many 
creditors. According to federal bankruptcy code, any municipality’s Plan of Adjustment must (1) 
divide creditors into classes in a way that is fair and equitable; (2) specify which classes are and 
are not impaired by the plan; and (3) treat all claims in a class equally unless particular 
claimants agree to less-favorable treatment.82  
The city divided its debt into seventeen classes of claims.83 The court considered six of 
these classes to be secured claims, which could not be altered or restructured during 
bankruptcy. Most of these claims were secured by the fact that the city had pledged specific 
revenue sources as collateral when it assumed the debt. For example, the vast majority of the 
city’s secured debt ($5.8 billion) came from bonds taken out against DWSD revenue. Mayor 
Kockrel “secured” the interest rate swap claims when he pledged casino revenue against these 
debts in 2009, but challenges to the legality of the swap deals allowed the city to pursue 
restructuring negotiations nonetheless. 
The remaining eleven classes of claims were unsecured, backed only by the general 
revenue and “good faith” of the city. These claims could be altered during the bankruptcy, so the 
case largely revolved around negotiating settlements from unsecured creditors. The largest, 
most expensive unsecured claims included the COPs debt and pension obligations. Syncora 
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Guarantee and FGIC held $1.47 billion in unsecured debt associated with COPs. The city treated 
the pension obligations as three different classes: Police and Fire Retirement System pensions, 
General Retirement System pensions, and retiree health care benefits (which, unlike the first 
two classes, involved only retirees). 
In April, UBS and BOA-ML agreed to a much smaller settlement on the 2005 swaps 
debt, this time accepting $85 million from the city.84 Between April and June of 2014, pension 
fund representatives, retirees, and works agreed to a 4.5% cut for general pensioners and no cut 
for police and fire pensioners but with a reduction of “cost of living adjustments” from 2.25% to 
1%.85 These figures compared favorably to the offer reportedly made by Orr to retirees in the 
days leading up to bankruptcy filing, which could have been possibly as low as ten cents on the 
dollar.86 
During these same months, the city also settled with unlimited tax general obligation 
bond insurance companies Assured, Ambac and National Public Finance Guarantee, paying off 
74% of their debt and redistributing 26% to low-income pensioners.87 In May, the United Auto 
Workers (UAW) agreed to raise funds to help offset retiree health care cuts.88 This unusual 
contribution was a concession to Michigan Speaker of the House Jase Bolger (R - 63rd District), 
who had - in what Minority Leader Gretchen Whitmer (D - 23rd District) called a “crass political 
move”89 - demanded private sector unions contribute to the grand bargain. 
Just days after the Plan of Adjustment confirmation trial began on September 2nd of 
2014, Detroit and Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb counties reached a deal to create a regional 
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water system, known as the Great Lakes Water Authority (GLWA). This agreement allowed 
Detroit to refinance massive amounts of debt associated with the DWSD (which would merge 
with the regional system) and will provide billions to the city over the next four decades to fix its 
water infrastructure.90 Almost simultaneously, the city reached a settlement with the bond 
insurance company Syncora, which included a 20-year lease extension on the Detroit-Windsor 
Tunnel.91 Detroit made a similar deal with FGIC, wherein the city promised FGIC purchasing 
rights to the former Joe Louis Arena site.92 
The confirmation trial closed on October 27th, less than two months after it began. 
Judge Rhodes approved the city’s Eighth Amended Plan of Adjustment on November 7th, ruling 
that the plan was both fair and financially feasible and calling the outcome “miraculous.”93 Now 
that I have provided a timeline of Detroit’s journey to and through bankruptcy, in the next 
chapter, I will return to a few of the key events to perform my distributional analysis.  
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Chapter 4: Whether Bankruptcy and Which  
Theoretical Approach 
The primary objective of my thesis is to analyze and explain the distributional effects of 
the Detroit bankruptcy in a political context. A case study of this nature does not currently exist 
in the literature on municipal bankruptcies, and theoretical work on the political nature of 
chapter 9 is similarly sparse. For this reason, I will begin this chapter with an overview of what I 
believe this sort of distributional analysis should entail. 
The core question of my analysis asks “cui bono?” - who benefits? Specifically, I seek to 
identify the winners and losers of Detroit’s bankruptcy and understand how this particular 
outcome came to be. Actors may “win” in comparison to one another and in comparison to 
themselves in some alternative state of events. Therefore, a distributional analysis of bankruptcy 
must explain the positions of relevant actors in relation to each other and in relation to what 
their positions might have been if the city’s fiscal crisis had unfolded without bankruptcy, or if 
the bankruptcy had been negotiated in a different way. 
From a purely economic standpoint, the “relevant actors” in this case include only those 
groups that competed directly for resources during the bankruptcy process. This description 
applies most obviously to Detroit’s creditors. In game theory, bankruptcy is fundamentally 
understood as the process by which a debtor’s assets are divided up among its creditors, whose 
combined claims sum to more than the total amount of those assets.94 In this way, bankruptcy is 
a zero-sum game in which creditors can only gain at the expense of one another. This 
understanding of bankruptcy as a Pareto efficient system informs the dominant approach to the 
topic in legal theory. In “Bankrupt Politics and the Politics of Bankruptcy,” Adam Levitin argues 
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that most legal theorists conceptualize bankruptcy as an exercise in economic efficiency 
designed to maximize collective creditor welfare.95 
It is important to distinguish here between private bankruptcy, with which most 
bankruptcy theory is concerned, and municipal bankruptcy. While Chapter 11 allows for the total 
liquidation of debtor assets for distribution among creditors, municipal bankruptcy code is 
explicitly designed to protect financially-distressed cities from liquidation. In practice, this 
means that the city may decide when sell its assets, balancing the absolution of debt through the 
liquidation of assets with long-term considerations of the future value of those assets for the 
city. For this reason, the city - or, more specifically, officials acting as agents of city residents - 
would also be considered a competitor in this zero-sum game. 
However, this purely economic approach is flawed because it fails to acknowledge that 
public bankruptcies are just as much political events as economic ones. More specifically, the 
dominant legal approach is poorly suited for municipal bankruptcies because it does not address 
the idea that distributional decisions in these cases are also political decisions. Therefore, rather 
than conceptualizing municipal bankruptcy as some sort of economic contract, we should 
understand it as a set of bargains and compromises between competing groups that unfold 
according to what Levitin calls “the political economics of loss allocation.”96 
This theory applies not only to the outcome of a municipal bankruptcy case, but also to 
the very decision to use bankruptcy as a tool to address fiscal distress. Levitin notes that 
bankruptcy is a significantly different distributional process from legislation, governed by its 
own set rules and norms.97 For one, chapter 9 gives judges and creditors, rather than voters and 
legislators, the power to make decisions regarding the distribution of city funds. Municipal 
bankruptcies also allow for alterations to collective bargaining agreements that are not typically 
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available to local elected officials. In assessing the political aspect of public bankruptcies we 
should consider that bankruptcy, as an alternative to legislative processes, may be preferable for 
certain interest groups.  
In this chapter, I illustrate these ideas more fully by using Detroit as a case study of the 
political economy of bankruptcy. Specifically, I will explain the distributive consequences of 
Detroit’s bankruptcy as political outcomes. This approach has two conceptual implications. 
First, my analysis will consider all groups and individuals who influenced the bankruptcy 
process, from the city’s 2013 fiscal crisis through the final Plan of Adjustment. This includes 
interest groups such as the city’s various creditors, city and state residents, and labor unions.98 It 
also includes officials who governed the process at various stages, including city, state, and 
federal elected officials, federal judges and mediators, and contracted lawyers and consultants. 
Second, “winning and losing” must be understood in a political-economic context. By 
this I mean that the interests and positions of all of the actors in this case were determined by 
the interplay between electoral and resource-driven motivations. Economic gain and political 
ambition are both important factors in explaining interests and behavior, and for assessing who 
benefited from Detroit’s bankruptcy saga. 
This chapter consists of three different sections, each presenting a distributional analysis 
of a different aspect of the case. The first explores the city’s progression, between 2011 and 2013, 
from fiscal crisis to bankruptcy. The second section looks at the regional deals that emerged 
during the bankruptcy trial, specifically the grand bargain over DIA artwork and the formation 
of the GLWA. Finally, the third section studies the concessions made by the different financial 
creditors in approving the Plan of Adjustment. 
At each of these stages of the case, I compare what happened in Detroit to counterfactual 
scenarios in which either the city did not declare bankruptcy or in which its bankruptcy 
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unfolded differently. Given that there are, in theory, an infinite number such states, it is 
important to identify which are the most plausible and salient.99 For the first stage of my 
analysis, the relevant counterfactuals are the bailouts that various officials, experts, and 
organizations proposed as alternatives to Detroit’s bankruptcy. In the second and third sections, 
I will compare the consequences of the city’s actual bankruptcy outcome to those that could have 
existed were certain key deals not reached. 
The Politics of Choosing Bankruptcy 
There is little dispute that by 2013, Detroit required some sort of financial intervention. 
As discussed in previous sections, municipal services in Detroit were drastically reduced by 2013 
due to repeated budget downsizing and the city’s steadily declining revenues. This crisis existed 
in two time-frames: immediate and long-term. Detroit needed to both address the looming 
threat of cash-flow insolvency as well as reverse structural trends that threatened the city’s 
solvency in the future.  
Emergency manager Kevyn Orr claimed the city would face a $198 million annual cash 
flow shortfall by fiscal year 2014 in his proposal to creditors.100 This amount included the city’s 
debt service, meaning that Detroit needed an annual revenue increase of around $198 million to 
avoid defaulting on its loans. In order to maintain long-term solvency, Detroit would also need 
to find a way to close the gap between its revenue and spending into the future.  
Despite the severity of the city’s fiscal crisis, public opinion polls from 2013 demonstrate 
that most Detroiters believed alternatives to bankruptcy existed. When asked in a survey, “do 
you think it was necessary for Kevyn Orr to begin bankruptcy proceedings to resolve the 
financial crisis in the City of Detroit,” 60% responded yes, while only 24% believed bankruptcy 
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was necessary.101 Local officials and organizations reflected this opinion, calling upon the federal 
and state governments to help Detroit secure the funds it needed to avoid bankruptcy. 
Proposed Federal Bailout 
Many in Detroit looked to the federal government to help address the city’s fiscal crisis. 
Former U.S. Representative Hansen Clarke (D - MI 13th District) was one prominent supporter 
of this option. In a 2012 editorial piece for the Huffington Post, Hansen wrote: 
As Motown inches ever closer toward an emergency manager takeover or chapter 9 
bankruptcy, city, state, and federal leaders would be wise to remember a key lesson of 
the New York's post-1970s economic miracle: that well-designed federal assistance can 
be both fiscally responsible and potentially transformative for a city in need.102 
In the same piece, Hansen proposed that Congress help Detroit regain short-term solvency by 
extending a Recovery Act program that reimbursed distressed cities for a portion of their 
interest payments. To address Detroit’s long-term issues, Hansen suggested Congress then use 
measures such as “reduced capital gains rates” to incentivize long-term investments in Detroit. 
Clarke reportedly spoke directly to President Obama about other forms of federal aid, such as 
department-specific grants to improve city services.103  
The possibility of assistance from the federal government seemed unlikely when, in July 
of 2013, Republicans in Congress introduced multiple amendments aimed at eliminating the 
possibility of a bailout for Detroit. Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) proposed an amendment to 
a general spending bill that would bar the use of federal funds to buy or guarantee municipal 
obligations from cities at risk of defaulting and prohibit the federal government from issuing 
lines of credit to distressed municipalities.104 Other Republican Senators, including Ron 
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Johnson (R-WI) and John Cornyn (R-TX), introduced similar amendments to a Housing and 
Urban Development bill that year.105 
 While both amendments were ultimately unsuccessful, they certainly reflected the 
preferences of important members of Congress regarding a federal bailout for Detroit. A review 
of Obama’s statements from his first campaign onwards reveal that he avoided mention of 
federal assistance to Detroit, even while praising his 2009 bailout of the city’s auto industry. By 
2013, an unnamed member of the Obama Administration told the New York Times that the 
chances that Congress would pass any legislation for Detroit were “somewhere between zero and 
zero.”106 Thus, Detroit never received assistance from the federal government to address the 
city’s short-term insolvency and keep appointed officials from pursuing bankruptcy. In the end, 
the Obama Administration waited until September of 2013, two months after the city had filed 
for bankruptcy, to provide Detroit with a $300 million aid package to help with quality of life 
programs like blight demolition and transportation.107  
Proposed State Bailout 
 According to former State Senate minority leader Gretchen Whitmer, the Michigan 
legislature debated the issue of a Detroit bailout “annually”108 when Democrats and labor unions 
called for the state to honor the 1998 handshake deal between Archer and Engler. Whitmer 
believed the Democratic position on this issue failed to gain traction due to the party’s dwindling 
political power in the legislature. However, appeals to restore revenue sharing to Detroit 
nevertheless took on particular urgency as the state assumed financial control of the city.  
In 2012, Detroit’s lead attorney, Corporation Counsel Krystal Crittendon, filed a lawsuit 
against the State of Michigan’s Treasury Department in an effort to block the Consent 
Agreement between Detroit and the state. In her suit, Crittendon claimed that the state owed 
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Detroit $244 million in reduced revenue sharing from the Archer-Engler agreement.109 (The 
Ingham County Circuit Court eventually dismissed the suit on the grounds that these debts were 
not legally binding.)110 The Detroit branch of the NAACP echoed Crittendon’s argument, calling 
for the state to restore revenue sharing to $270 million by May of 2013. Chapter President 
Reverend Dr. Wendell Anthony wrote to Snyder: “We well understand that Detroit and other 
municipalities across the state are experiencing financial hardship. But a major part of Detroit’s 
budget problems are the direct result of state policies that have drained the city budget of 
revenues.”111  
In November 2013, Wallace Turbeville, a senior fellow at Demos think tank and former 
vice president of Goldman Sachs, published a similar recommendation for addressing Detroit’s 
fiscal crisis. Turbeville recommended that Orr avoid bankruptcy by closing the state’s immediate 
cash flow shortfall. Orr could do this, Turbeville wrote, by asking the state to restore 
discretionary revenue sharing, helping the city to collect unpaid taxes, and contributing other 
funds “on an emergency basis.”112 This, he suggested, would provide short term relief while the 
state collaborated with the city on economic improvement projects to grow Detroit’s tax base. 
Detroiters Resisting Emergency Management (DREM) cited Turbeville’s report in their 
proposed “People’s Plan for Restructuring Toward a Sustainable Detroit,” endorsed by over 
thirty local community organizations and churches. The DREM Plan argued that “budget 
concerns must emphasize eliminating the budget shortfall of $198 million rather than 
continually targeting the questionable figures relied on by the emergency manager to justify his 
actions based on inflated long term debt.”113 Like Turbeville, Anthony, and Crittendon, DREM 
called for the state to do this by increasing revenue sharing, though it did not specifically say by 
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how much. The DREM plan also called on the Michigan Legislature to enforce a reverse 
commuter tax that would require automatic payroll deductions for Detroiters working outside 
the city, rather than relying on these commuters to surrender the tax themselves. DREM 
projected $40-50 million additional revenues from this legislation, but a 2009 study 
commissioned by then-Mayor Dave Bing estimated that it could yield as much as $142 million.114 
Choosing Bankruptcy 
The crucial question in determining if Detroit had financially feasible alternatives to 
bankruptcy is whether or not the long-term, structural challenges facing Detroit included its 
pension and OPEB obligations. Proponents of state and federal bailouts identified these 
challenges as the economic and fiscal trends that contributed to Detroit’s declining revenues. 
They believed their proposed alternatives were viable because they included, along with 
immediate aid to address the city’s short-term insolvency, plans to change Detroit’s economic 
momentum and help the city capture revenue going forward. In contrast, Republican politicians 
and the experts they appointed and hired argued that these alternatives were not feasible 
because they could not address the structural problem of the retirement systems. They pointed 
to huge amounts of debt associated with pension and OPEB obligations that could only be 
legally115 restructured through bankruptcy. 
Michigan State Treasurer Andy Dillon made this argument on a local Detroit radio 
station in 2012. Dillon first acknowledged that the state had failed to uphold its end of the 1998 
deal between Engler and Archer, estimating, as Crittendon did in her lawsuit, “if you add up the 
last revenue sharing it totals up to $224 million.”116 But Dillon quickly rejected the possibility of 
the state turning over this money to Detroit, saying, “So while that would be nice if it would get 
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us through this year and probably next year it won't solve the systemic structural problems the 
city has.” He specifically labeled the pensions and OPEB as the “structural problem,” saying “I 
think the review team will find [the retirement system] unsustainable and that, to me, is a big 
problem.”117  
Snyder’s administration continued to reiterate this argument over the course of the 
following year. When Representative Clarke publically called on Snyder to wait to appoint an 
emergency manager until after he could explore the possibility of federal aid to Detroit, Snyder 
responded to the press: “We’re happy for him to pursue any type of federal money he can, but if 
there isn’t [sic] structural changes, the city will be in the same situation down the road.”118 On 
Face the Nation in 2013, Snyder told the host: “I don’t view [a bailout] as the right answer. The 
right answer is, bankruptcy is there to help deal with the debt question.”119  
Politicians at the national level echoed these comments. In a guest column in USA 
Today, Senator Ron Johnson explained his proposal to block federal aid to Detroit, writing: 
Detroit's failure is rooted in an unholy alliance between politicians and public sector 
unions. Its 47 municipal unions spent their members’ dues to elect public officials who 
then “negotiated” with those same unions for overly generous contracts that resulted in 
bankruptcy … Federal bankruptcy court is the proper venue for settling these debts and 
obligations that taxpayers cannot afford.120 
Johnson continued his call for bankruptcy in another public statement, saying: “What must not 
happen is a federal bailout that spares Detroit from making the needed reforms that the 
bankruptcy process may require."121 
At the state and federal level, Republicans rejected the idea of assisting Detroit based on 
the argument that proposed alternatives could not address the issue of the city’s pension and 
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OPEB debt, which threatened Detroit’s long term solvency and fiscal stability. Because this 
threat could only be addressed through bankruptcy, Chapter 9 was the city’s only option, and 
Detroit had no choice but to file for bankruptcy.  
This narrative places considerable importance on the size of the city’s retiree obligations, 
which needed to appear both high and drastically underfunded to support the conclusion that 
bankruptcy was inevitable. In his “Proposal to Creditors,” Orr reported that the present value of 
the city’s liabilities from the GRS and PFRS amounted to $9.2 billion: $5.7 billion from health 
care, $3.5 from pensions.122 This represented over half of city’s total debt, which Orr reported to 
be about $18 billion. Perhaps more significantly, it was roughly 80% of the city’s reported total 
unsecured debt, the kind of debt that can be diminished or restructured during bankruptcy. Not 
only did the media widely circulate these figures, but Judge Rhodes referred to them when he 
declared Detroit bankrupt in his written “Statement Regarding Eligibility.”  
It is unclear, however, how exactly Orr generated these numbers in his proposal. At one 
point, Orr writes “Further analysis by the city using more realistic assumptions (including by 
reducing the discount rate by one percentage point) suggests that pension UAAL123 will be 
approximately $3.5 billion as of June 30, 2013,” but never specifies what these assumptions are. 
Similarly, Orr states that “As of the most recent valuation (June 30, 2011), OPEB unfunded 
liabilities totaled $5.7 billion and are expected to grow absent restructuring,” but does not 
provide the details or origins of this valuation.124  
When questioned by lawyers representing various retiree groups during Detroit’s 
eligibility hearing, Orr testified that he based his assessments of retirement liabilities on reports 
from Milliman Inc., an actuarial and consulting firm based in Seattle. Neither Orr nor Rhodes 
included Milliman’s actuarial studies in their written statements on Detroit’s financial condition, 
and these reports were only made public through Freedom of Information Action (FOIA) 
                                               
122
 City of Detroit, “Proposal to Creditors,” 23. 
123
 UAAL stands for “Underfunded Actuarial Accrued Liabilities.” 
124
 City of Detroit, “Proposal to Creditors,” 23. 
40 
 
requests from the Detroit Free Press. In the FOIA-ed studies, addressed to a partner at Orr’s law 
firm, Milliman actuaries included the disclaimer: “Our projection is suitable for explaining 
emerging trends in costs and liabilities, but is significantly less robust than a projection based on 
a full valuation.”125 
In addition to Milliman’s own reservations concerning the paucity of their work, 
independent reports called further attention to the unorthodox methodology used to calculate 
pension liabilities. Rachel Barkley, a municipal credit analyst with Morningstar investment firm, 
released an analysis of the Milliman studies in August of 2013, soon after the Free Press made 
them public. In her report, Barkley pointed to three questionable aspects of the studies:  the 
assumed rate of return, amortization period, and asset valuation method.126  
Barkley noted that the assumed rate of return on pension fund investments used by 
Milliman varied between 6.3 and 7.5%, well below the most common rate of return used by 
pension funds in the U.S., 8%. Turbeville, in his report on the bankruptcy, brought up the fact 
that Milliman itself assumed a 7.65% rate of return in the firm’s separate assessments of over 
100 other pension funds. Mike Mulholland, former president of the Detroit AFSCME chapter, 
recalled that during bankruptcy negotiations with union leaders, Orr used the rate of as a 
bargaining tool, rather than treating it as an actuarial fact.127 According to Mulholland, deciding 
on a rate of return “wasn’t math, it was politics.” 
Barkley also commented that Milliman’s assumed amortization period appears to deviate 
from actuarial standards. A pension fund’s “amortization period” is the allotted time period the 
fund has to pay off its debt in fixed payments. Milliman cut the period in half, from the standard 
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of 30 years to 15 years, significantly increasing the overall pension debt amount. Finally, both 
Turbeville and Barkley noted Milliman’s reduced use of “smoothing” to measure the value of the 
pension funds’ assets. Smoothing refers to the standard practice of using “actuarial value 
assessments” of fund assets, rather than market value assessments. This is typically done to 
account for short-term fluctuations in the stock and bond market. Barkley wrote that while the 
Milliman report appeared to have used some smoothing, Orr likely removed it entirely in his 
calculations for the Proposal to Creditors, using the market value of GRS and PFRS assets 
instead. Due to the fact that the economy was still recovering from the recession, this 
methodological choice reduced the estimated value of the assets and made the funds’ net 
liabilities appear much larger. According to Barkley, this probably also accounted for the 
difference between the Milliman calculations and the figures that appear in Orr’s proposal. 
Taken together, Barkley wrote, Orr’s practices “clearly fall outside of industry norms.”128 
The origin of Orr’s $5.7 billion estimate on Detroit’s retiree healthcare liabilities is also 
unclear. Though Orr does not provide citations for these figures or include calculations, 
Turbeville guessed his source may have been a 2013 Pew Study “A Widening Gap in Cities.”129 
The Pew study, Turbeville wrote, notably assumed much larger increases in healthcare costs 
than were born by recent historic trends. 
It is very likely that the retirement systems were more fully funded, and liabilities were 
significantly smaller, than Orr suggested. This means that retiree benefit agreements were not 
the structural time bomb that Snyder and others portrayed them to be. Thus, Detroit most likely 
did not need to reduce its retiree benefits to achieve long-term financial stability, and therefore 
bankruptcy was not the city’s only option. If there were financial alternatives, how did Detroit 
arrive at bankruptcy? Most likely, the retirement systems were used as an excuse to avoid 
pursuing the politically non-viable option of assistance to Detroit.  
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Republicans, many of whom vocally opposed aiding Detroit, exerted considerable 
influence on both the state and national stage in 2012-2013. In Michigan, Republicans held a 
majority in both the Michigan State Senate and House of Representatives from 2011 onward. 
Snyder himself had few electoral incentives to oppose his own party to appeal to Detroit voters 
with a state bailout. Though Detroit represented a substantial Michigan electorate in terms of 
population, the city aligned historically with the Democratic Party. In 2010, for example, 93.7% 
of Detroit voters had supported Snyder’s Democratic opponent, Virg Bernero.130 Though a very 
slim majority of Democratic voters at a national level approved of  assistance to Detroit,131 
Obama’s silence regarding a federal bailout suggests this was not enough to incentivize him to 
oppose Republicans on this issue.  
The state and federal political context made proposed alternatives politically unrealistic, 
rather than financially unrealistic. Orr appeared to have accepted this as given even before he 
assumed his appointment as Detroit’s emergency manager. FOIA requests revealed email 
exchanges between Orr and his colleagues at the Jones Day law firm in which he anticipated the 
reaction to a potential Detroit bankruptcy, predicting “the Reps [sic] would rail against any 
further federal bailouts … plus, if the feds did anything for Detroit, a number of other 
municipalities would have their hands out at a time when no one’s in the mood to dole out 
federal largess.”132  
A generous assumption is that officials at the state or national level were primarily 
concerned with the wellbeing of the residents of Detroit. Knowing that bailout options were not 
politically viable, they instead played up the issue of the pensions so the city could pursue 
bankruptcy, where at least its debt could be restructured to free up some of the city’s very 
limited revenue. A less generous interpretation, suggested by some observers, is that officials 
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were also motivated by a larger, overarching desire to cut public pensions and benefits. 
According to this theory, Detroit’s bankruptcy was part of a larger political agenda - the city was 
used to set a precedent for the rest of the state to cut pensions and benefits and make it easier 
for Republicans to perform on their promise of low taxes and reduced spending.  
During closing arguments for the bankruptcy eligibility hearing, lawyers for Detroit’s 
municipal unions presented a version of this interpretation for the court. Sharon Levine from 
AFSCME noted, “we don’t see valuations. We don’t see appraisals. We don’t see actuarial 
reports. We don’t see any expert reports with regard to the shortfall - alleged shortfall in the 
vested pension benefits or otherwise. And we have heard that that’s for strategic reasons.”133 
Thomas Ciantra from the UAW was more explicit about what exactly these “strategic reasons” 
were: “What they have done is used the Chapter 9 process, used the threat of Chapter 9, to – to 
put the pension benefits at play.”134 Turbeville made a similar indictment of Orr in an opinion 
piece for the Huffington Post in which he postulated that Orr “may have seen his mission to 
include damaging the public employee unions forever by fundamentally altering the retirement 
system.”135 
There is evidence to substantiate the claim that state officials viewed impairing retiree 
benefits as an independent goal. First, the FOIA-ed emails containing Milliman’s reports on the 
city’s pension systems were addressed to a lawyer at Jones Day.136 This suggests the Snyder 
Administration apparently solicited the services of a bankruptcy law firm prior to receiving any 
sort of detailed study of the systems pension fund liabilities. Not only was a Jones Day a law 
firm with a leading bankruptcy practice, it was a firm that, in 2010, circulated a White Paper 
recommending states and cities use bankruptcy to adjust their pension obligations. In this 
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document, “An Overview of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: Municipal Debt Adjustments,” 
lawyers from Jones Day wrote: 
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code offers many tools and strategies to a struggling 
municipality that are not available under otherwise applicable state law. In fact, seeking 
chapter 9 protection may be the only alternative for some municipalities facing 
unprecedented budget shortfalls and excessively burdensome pension and other 
obligations.137 
Finally, the fact that Snyder chose not to pursue a bankruptcy with contingencies to 
protect retirees further bolstered this interpretation. During his testimony at the eligibility 
hearings, lawyers representing Detroit’s retirees questioned Snyder regarding a correspondence 
between the Governor and his chief legal advisor, Mike Gadola. In the document, Gadola urged 
Snyder to authorize Detroit’s bankruptcy with contingencies that the pensions and OPEB not be 
altered, as was permitted in Michigan’s laws regarding municipal bankruptcy.  
Ronald King [attorney for GRS and PFRS]: “And why is it that you chose not to put a 
contingency in the July 18th authorization related to accrued pension benefits?” 
Governor Snyder: “I made a decision not to put a contingency with respect to any 
conditions because my concern was is this is an extremely difficult process; that we're in 
a crisis mode; and that we have serious issues here. And I felt it could be an issue causing 
more delays, concern, complexity to a very complex case to begin with ... I thought it was 
a good opportunity to get people that are the appropriate people to make decisions that 
then I can help support the city in the implementation.”138 
In other words, Snyder declined to take steps to protect the retirees because he believed 
bankruptcy was the appropriate forum for addressing the future of Detroit’s retirement systems. 
 This interpretation is consistent with the pre-existing dynamics between Snyder and 
organized labor in Michigan. In the 2010 gubernatorial election, labor overwhelmingly 
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supported Snyder’s Democratic opponent.139 The relationship became particularly strained after 
Snyder signed Right to Work legislation in 2012.140 American Federation of Labor and Congress 
of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) President Richard Trumka warned that the new law 
would “diminish the voice of every working man and woman in Michigan,” and called Snyder “a 
puppet of extreme donors.”141 The idea that Snyder used Detroit’s fiscal crisis as an opportunity 
to further challenge public sector unions is congruous with current trends in national politics, as 
the presidential candidacy of Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker demonstrated.142 Similarly, 
recent scholarship finds that Republicans in many states used post-recession municipal 
budgetary problems to justify laws that have weakened or eliminated public sector unions.143  
Distributive Consequences of Choosing Bankruptcy 
Republicans leaders rejected proposed state and federal bailouts for Detroit based on the 
argument that the city’s fiscal crisis was primarily the result of its under-funded, overly-
generous retirement systems, which could only be addressed through bankruptcy. However, I 
have argued that a closer look at the debt figures used to make this argument reveals that 
Detroit’s retirement systems were more fiscally stable than suggested and that proposed 
alternatives to bankruptcy were therefore financially viable. Instead, it was the political context 
at the state and federal level that foreclosed on the feasibility of a bailout for Detroit. Further, I 
have argued that Republicans in Michigan used Detroit’s fiscal crisis as an opportunity to 
weaken labor’s position in the state. 
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Thomas Ciantra, a lawyer for the UAW, told the court in his closing argument, “No one, I 
think, can deny that there is a fiscal problem here. No one can deny that there is a need for 
reinvestment. The question is, who is going to pay for that.”144 By choosing bankruptcy over 
bailouts, officials made it so that the retired workers, and not the state or federal government, 
had to “pay” by accepting cuts to their retirement benefits. This choice shifted the cost of 
addressing Detroit’s fiscal crisis to a low income sector of the population.145 Further, municipal 
unions and retiree associations now had to negotiate to protect what would have been secured 
incomes outside bankruptcy. As I will discuss in the following section, this made municipal 
unions vulnerable to demands from Republicans, which could further weaken their position 
relative to the state in the future. 
Regional Deals 
Grand Bargain 
Once Judge Rhodes ruled that Detroit was eligible for Chapter 9 protection, court-
appointed mediators began the process of negotiating with creditors and the city to determine 
which municipal assets would be available for distribution among creditors. According to Judge 
Gerald Rosen, the lead mediator for the case, it became clear that the DIA artwork was the city’s 
only real asset and, besides tax revenue, its only means of paying creditors.146 At that point, 
Rosen looked at the case and saw two competing interests: public artwork and pensions. This 
tension took on additional significance because the museum was tied in many ways to the 
region’s white, suburban elite. (In Rosen’s words, the board of the DIA was a “who’s-who” of 
Southeast Michigan.147) Detroit retirees and employees, on the other hand, were mostly black 
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and working class. The Judge worried that the prospect of liquidating the DIA artwork had the 
potential to create a “civil war” in the region around historical issues of race and class.  
According to Rosen, the idea for the deal that would eventually be known as the “grand 
bargain” came from a suggestion by one of the GRS lawyers that the state buy the artwork. 
When Governor Snyder and his advisors initially rejected the idea, Rosen turned to local and 
national philanthropic foundation. Beginning with the Ford Foundation, these organizations 
made multi-million dollar pledges to protect the artwork. The museum itself solicited private 
donations from its own network to contribute to fundraising efforts.  
In the end, the combined funds totaled $366 million from the foundations and $100 
million from the “DIA Direct Funders,” to be contributed over the course of a 20-year period. 
the legal agreement approved by the Court, funds from these two sources would go to the city’s 
two Retirement Systems and could not be subject to claims by the city’s other creditors. The 
pledges from the foundations also contained requirements for “stakeholder participation,” 
meaning the donations were contingent upon the state itself contributing the bargain. In 
Rosen’s estimation, once this money was “on the line,”148 Snyder felt that he could not walk 
away. The Governor eventually agreed to a $350 million contributed, payable over 20 years, to 
the GRS and PFRS “for the benefit of Holders of Pension Claims.”149  
In exchange for the combined $816 million in funds for the retirement systems, the city 
agreed to transfer all of its rights to and ownership of the DIA collection to the nonprofit “DIA 
Corporation” as trustee. The artwork would be held by this charitable trust in perpetuity for “the 
primary benefit of the residents of the city and the Counties and the citizens of the State.”150 
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Distributive Consequences of the Grand Bargain 
The immediate effects of the deal benefitted the retirees, and, to some extent, Detroit 
residents. Rosen described this goal of the grand bargain in his official press release regarding 
foundation contributions:  
It bears emphasis that the foundations’ agreement to participate is specifically 
conditioned upon all of their funds being committed to the twin goals of helping the 
city’s recovery from bankruptcy by assisting the funding of the retirees’ pensions and 
preserving the DIA’s art collection as part of an overall balanced settlement of disputes 
in the bankruptcy.151 
Essentially, the bargain gave retirees the value of Detroit’s only asset while still allowing the 
residents to enjoy that asset.  
However, it should be noted that some commentators have overstated the extent to 
which the grand bargain benefited Detroit residents by “saving”152 the DIA. After the bankruptcy 
case ended, Judge Rhodes made it clear that he had never believed it legally possible for the city 
to sell DIA collections to repay creditors.153 Given that Rhodes had the ultimate power to 
approve or reject the city’s Plan of Adjustment, it therefore seems unlikely the art would have 
been sold had the grand bargain not transpired. Rosen recalled asking Rhodes not to disclose his 
opinion on the artwork so that he could use the DIA as an asset during mediations.154 Thus, a 
more accurate interpretation of the grand bargain is that it the DIA provided a mechanism to the 
court to secure foundation, donor, and state funds for retirees exclusively, avoiding the city’s 
other creditors.  
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Syncora Guarantee, one of the firms that backed the COPs deal in 2005, objected to the 
bargain for exactly this reason. Specifically, Syncora based its complaint on the fact that 
bankruptcy law required that both Syncora and the retiree classes, as unsecured creditors, 
receive equal treatment in the case: 
The Grand Bargain was orchestrated to maximize recoveries for politically favored, 
insider creditors while protecting the Museum Assets from all other creditors and the 
city itself … A plan born from collusion and unfairness … quasi-political maneuver by 
Judge Rosen … to pick winners and losers in the bankruptcy (pensioners and mostly 
suburban patrons of the art versus other creditors) while simultaneously transferring the 
Museum Assets beyond the reach of all present and future creditors other than the 
chosen winners.155  
Syncora’s complaint captures another aspect of the bargain: the deal represented a transfer of 
money to retirees, not only from foundations, donors, and the state, but also from the city’s 
other creditors. Syncora and Detroit’s other unsecured creditors believed they were legally 
entitled to some return on their loans to the city. Therefore, excluding these creditors from the 
bargain and giving the entirety of the city’s only assets to the retirees effectively took money 
from the former and gave it to the later. 
The immediate consequences of the deal appear to favor Detroit residents and retirees at 
the expense of the foundations, donors, and state and (unwillingly) the other creditors. 
However, certain conditions attached to the state’s contribution complicate the idea that the 
grand bargain was a “win” for the retirees. First, as stated in the final Plan of Adjustment, the 
state’s participation in the grand bargain was conditional upon 
active support of the Plan, by a release of and covenant not to sue the State from, and an 
agreement not to support in any way the litigation described in subsection (f) of this 
Section by, the city, the Retiree Committee, the Retirement Systems and certain unions 
and retiree associations. 
“Subsection (f)” includes: 
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Cessation of all litigation … including the cessation of funding of any litigation initiated 
by any other party, as it relates to the city, (i) challenging PA 436 or any actions taken 
pursuant to PA 436 or (ii) seeking to enforce Article IX, Section 24 of the Michigan 
Constitution156 
This meant that not only did retirees have to vote to approve the Plan, but that the city, retirees, 
and various labor organizations involved in Detroit’s bankruptcy had to agree to drop all legal 
challenges to Public Act for 436 (the most recent emergency manager law) and the use of 
bankruptcy to override the Michigan constitution.  
For retirees, agreeing to the grand bargain meant accepting significant cuts to their 
pensions and benefits. Per the Plan of Adjustment,157 Police and Fire Department retirees 
received no reduction in accrued pension benefits, but a 45% reduction in cost of living 
adjustments (COLA). GRS retirees experienced a 4.5% reduction in accrued pension benefit 
amount, the complete elimination of COLA, and the “clawback” of $190 million in annuities 
from a supplemental retirement program within the GRS.158 Both groups received a 25% 
reduction in OPEB. Interestingly, both systems were required by the Plan to use a 6.75% rate of 
investment return assumption (compared to the standard 8%) until 2023. 
Accepting the bargain also meant that retirees had to forgo the option to challenge these 
cuts based on protections given to collective bargaining agreements in the Michigan 
constitution. Attorney General Bill Schuette gave the retirees grounds for such objections by 
asserting that the pension and benefits were protected in Michigan under Article IX, Section 24 
of the state’s constitution (the section named specifically in the state’s conditions).159 When the 
retiree classes agreed to the grand bargain, Schuette wrote that the pensioners had waived this 
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constitutional right. Schuette’s office wrote in a press release, “In keeping with past filings, 
Schuette noted that honoring the pensioners' vote on the proposed Plan of Adjustment is 
consistent with existing legal precedent allowing certain rights to be subject to negotiation.”160 
The significance of the retiree group’s decision to accept the bargain became clear after 
Detroit exited bankruptcy and a group of dissenting retirees appealed the case. This appeal went 
before U.S. District Court. Judge Bernard Friedman who rejected it on the grounds that it would 
“unravel the Grand Bargain” and cause 
(1) the State to commence measures to recover the State’s contribution and (2) the DIA 
Funding Parties to withhold hundreds of millions of dollars in funding not yet disbursed 
to the city. Simply put, unimpairing GRS Pension Claims would not only threaten the 
success of the Plan, it would cast the city into a renewed financial emergency.161 
Retirees and their representative unions agreed to the grand bargain because they 
believed it was the best possible outcome they could expect. Shirley Lightsey, then-president of 
the Detroit Retired City Employees Association, captured this sense of resignation when she told 
retirees, “You can't eat principles and uncertainty doesn't pay the bills.”162 Mulholland recalled 
that the statewide chapter of AFSCME (Detroit’s largest union) “didn’t think they could win 
anything in bankruptcy,” and pressured local chapters to accept the deal without protest.163 
Democrats in the state legislature, having heard from their Detroit and retiree constituents that 
neither group could afford to reject the deal, voted to approve the state’s contribution.164 
In many ways, Republican officials were probably the biggest winners of the grand 
bargain. Their added conditions to the deal, which Rosen recalled as crucial to the state’s 
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participation,165 eliminated the possibility of the pensioners either derailing the Plan of 
Adjustment approval process or asking another court to hold the state responsible for the 
retirement system debt. Further, the fact that many municipal unions gave up their ability to 
challenge the state’s use of emergency management and bankruptcy to diminish collective 
bargaining agreements will likely make it much easier for the state to repeat what was done in 
Detroit elsewhere in Michigan. This is particularly relevant for the eleven other cities in 
Michigan currently under emergency management.166 Randy Richardville, the Majority Leader 
of the Michigan State Senate at the time, recalled his role as a leader of the bipartisan effort to 
win legislative approval for the state’s contribution to the grand bargain: “I looked at [the 
contribution] as an investment.”167 
The Great Lakes Water Authority 
Perhaps the most important aspect of Detroit’s pre-bankruptcy finances, besides the 
DIA, was the city’s water and sewerage department. In 2013, DWSD was one of the largest 
municipal water and sewerage systems in the country. DWSD provided services to Detroit as 
well as many other cities in an eight-county area, covering 1,079 square miles.168 There was also 
an enormous amount of secured debt tied to DWSD, as the city had repeatedly backed its 
borrowing by using revenues from the department as collateral. Because the city could not 
impair these secured debts during bankruptcy, Orr proposed privatization as an alternative 
means of addressing DWSD liabilities. When initiatives to monetize DWSD failed, the city 
turned instead to the prospect of “regionalizing” the water and sewerage system.169  
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According to Rosen, it was newly elected Mayor Duggan who came up with the idea of 
addressing DWSD debt by “trading governance for money.”170 This formed the backbone of the 
agreement among Detroit and Oakland, Wayne, and Macomb counties to transform DWSD 
operations into the GLWA. Per this agreement, Detroit continues to own the whole water and 
sewerage system but will lease infrastructure outside city limits to the Authority for the next 40 
years. In return, the GLWA pays Detroit $50 million a year, earmarked for improvements to the 
city’s water infrastructure. This lease payment technically comes from “common-to-all” GLWA 
revenues, meaning suburban cities pay an estimated two-thirds of the lease and Detroit one-
third.171 Most importantly, the GLWA assumed all remaining, post-bankruptcy DWSD debt.172   
The GLWA governing board now consists of two appointees from Detroit, one appointee 
each from Oakland, Macomb and Wayne counties, and one from the Governor. This represents a 
change in majority power - previously, Detroit had four votes on the DWSD board and the 
suburbs had three.173 This board manages suburban and “common-to-all” operations, which 
include approving utility rates and issuing debt. Though DWSD controls its own water and 
sewerage system within Detroit, the city is still technically a wholesale customer of the GLWA 
and is required to pay its water and sewerage invoices to the Authority. Approximately 500 
DWSD employees stayed within the city’s department, and 900 became employees of the 
GLWA.174  
The initial Memorandum of Understanding for the GLWA also included plans to develop 
a regional assistance programs for low-income residents in Southeast Michigan. The Water 
Residence Assistance Program (WRAP), developed in the midst of controversial water shutoffs 
that brought international scrutiny to DWSD operations in 2014-5,175 is funded with 0.5% of the 
                                               
170
 Rosen interview. 
171
 Oakland County, “GLWA Responses to Major Concerns,” news release, July 24, 2015. 
172
 GLWA, “Memorandum of Understanding,” 2. 
173
 Oakland County, “Responses to Major Concerns.”  
174
 GLWA, “Memorandum of Understanding,” 6. 
175
 Laura Gottesdiener, “UN ‘Shocked’ by Detroit’s Mass Water Shut-Offs,” Al-Jazeera, October 20, 2014. 
54 
 
GLWA base operating revenues.176 This program will be available for customers at or below 
150% of the Federal Poverty Guidelines for their previous month’s income whose water account 
status is at least 30 days past due. WRAP covers one-third of the cost of the average monthly bill 
of these customers, freezes overdue amounts, and places utility shutoff holds on their client 
accounts. Eligible customers also receive one-time payments of up to $1,000 for approved, 
minor water-related plumbing repairs on their properties.177 
Distributional Consequences of the Great Lakes Water Authority 
There are three important distributive components of the GLWA deal. The first is the 
creation of WRAP, which represents a method of distributing throughout the region the cost of 
assisting low-income Detroit residents with their utility bills. Prior to the creation of the GLWA, 
Detroit relied a combination of borrowing and, more recently, non-profit assistance or service 
shutoffs to address the issue of unpaid utility accounts.178 Detroit’s concentration of low-income 
residents at risk of falling behind on their bills made it difficult for the DWSD to cover the cost 
of its operations within the city, let alone provide assistance to these residents. As stated above, 
revenue from all of the GLWA’s wholesale customers will now fund WRAP, incorporating 
wealthier areas of the metro-Detroit region into an assistance program. Without the GLWA deal, 
this regionally redistributive system likely would not have occurred. 
Second, the city will receive an estimated $33 million (two-thirds of the $50 million 
GLWA lease) from the suburbs annually to use for capital improvements to its water and 
sewerage operations. These updates to DWSD’s facilities are also intended to lower the 
department’s operational expenses so as to reduce utility rates for Detroiters in the future. In 
Judge Rosen’s words, the city receives this money in exchange for governance of the regional 
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system.179 There is no real economic cost to the city in this exchange, however, because 
operational control of DWSD came with responsibility for the systems massive debt. At the time 
officials reached the GLWA deal, DWSD operated at a yearly loss of around $200 million per 
year180 - a burden that the GLWA largely absorbed. Most likely, the suburbs agreed to this with 
the understanding that once this debt was no longer associated with the Detroit, it could be 
refinanced and utility rates in the suburbs would decrease.181 
A third, and significantly less discussed feature of the GLWA is what Mulholland called 
the “convoluted and twisted tale”182 of the water and sewerage employees. In its Memorandum 
of Understanding with DWSD, the GLWA promised to honor collective bargaining agreements 
between DWSD and the employees that transitioned from one entity to the other.183 However, in 
the fall of 2015, the GLWA required these employees to reapply for their positions, assigning 
them to different unions that did not have collective bargaining agreements with DWSD.184 The 
GLWA then offered either privatized or defined-contribution retirement plans, which the 
employees viewed as considerably less favorable than the defined-benefit plans they had 
previously had as part of Detroit’s GRS.185 Thus, while the transition in governance between 
DWSD and the GLWA came at no cost to the city, it did result in a loss of retirement benefits for 
many workers, beyond what they would have otherwise experienced in bankruptcy. 
Observers applauded the grand bargain and GLWA as rare instances of collaboration 
between the city and its suburbs, government officials and private foundations, Republicans and 
                                               
179
 Rosen interview. 
180
 Bob Daddow, “Assessment of the DWSD Financial Projections Included in Revised Disclosure 
Statements,” April 18, 2014, oaklandtownship.org. 
181
 DWSD, “GLWA Update: Veolia Peer Review,” October 23, 2014, dwsd.org. 
182
 Mulholland interview. 
183
 GLWA, “Memorandum of Understanding,” 6.  
184
 AFSCME Local 207, “Rally to Stop Layoffs and Demand Fair Contracts,” October 7, 2015, 
Asfsme207.com. Mulholland interview. 
185
 GLWA, “Employment Terms for the Great Lakes Water Authority,” October 2015, page 18. 
56 
 
Democrats.186 Many pointed to the fact that the GLWA will provide Detroit residents with 
benefits in the form of WRAP and possibly lower future water rates, or that the grand bargain 
secured $816 million for retirees. However, these deals came at significant costs to Detroit 
retirees and current workers, who experienced cuts to their retirement benefits, as well as to 
municipal unions, which likely gave up significant future bargaining power to the state. 
Financial Settlements  
Other than the retirees, the two most important classes of creditors in the bankruptcy 
consisted of the financial service industries that had backed the city’s COPs and swaps 
transactions from the mid-2000s. Not only were these claims large - over $1.7 billion, combined 
- but they were also legally complex and defended persistently by the creditors.  
Interest Rate Swaps 
Detroit’s 2005 swaps deal consisted, first, of UBS and BOA-ML synthetically converting 
interest rates on the city’s COP debt. This arrangement eventually put Detroit in greater debt 
when interest rates fell and the city was locked into paying the banks higher rate than the banks 
were paying in return. The swap deal also included stipulations for “automatic termination” 
payments if the city’s credit rating fell. Detroit put its casino revenue up as collateral to avoid 
these payments when rating agencies downgraded its bonds to “junk” status in 2009. 
Despite the fact that the claims were technically secured by casino revenues, Judge 
Rhodes opined that there was significant evidence that the deals were illegal, and ordered the 
banks to settle for a portion of their overall debt.187  Rhodes and others questioned the legality of 
the swaps deals on the grounds that the original agreement pushed Detroit over its legal 
borrowing limit, and the 2009 patch-up deal was an unauthorized use of gaming revenues under 
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Michigan law. Believing the city to be “reasonably likely”188 to win a potential lawsuit against 
UBS and BOA-ML, he rejected two proposed deals between the city and UBS and BOA-ML, 
finding that both were too generous to the banks.  
The banks eventually agreed to a much smaller settlement in April of 2014, accepting 
$85 million ($42.5 million each) from the city. Rhodes ruled that this amount was appropriate 
given that a lawsuit against the banks would likely be expensive, drawn out, and without 
guarantee of success.189 Eighty-five million, Rhodes opined, was a fair price for the city to pay to 
avoid litigation yet still shed a significant amount of debt. Specifically, the settlement reflected 
the value, to the city, of avoiding expensive and potentially drawn out litigation against the 
banks. 
Certificates of Participation 
In 2005, Detroit funded its pension obligations with $1.4 billion from Syncora and FGIC. 
In exchanged, the firms received certificates funded by service contracts between the city and 
shell “service corporations” associated with its two retirement systems. Because this debt was 
both unsecured and subject to legal scrutiny, the city proposed considerable cuts to the COPs 
claims in both Orr’s Proposal to Creditors and in early versions of the Plan of Adjustment. 
Syncora and FGIC responded by pursuing numerous legal challenges to the bankruptcy process 
at every step. These included objections from Syncora to both the grand bargain and final Plan 
of Adjustment, and a lawsuit from FGIC claiming the city had fraudulently led the firm into the 
COP transaction.190  
 According to bankruptcy code, Rhodes could have forced the Plan of Adjustment 
concessions on FGIC and Syncora once the other creditors had voted to approve the plan.191 But 
with legal challenges outstanding, the firms still held over Detroit the threat of expensive 
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litigation and a protracted approval process. Mediators and lawyers for the city therefore 
continued to pursue settlements with both Syncora and FGIC, eventually reaching agreements 
in the fall of 2014. 
Per these agreements, Syncora and FGIC both withdrew all litigation against the city and 
accepted an 87% cut on the COP debt. Detroit, too, dropped its lawsuit questioning the legality 
of the COPs deal. Syncora received a 26-year extension of its lease on the Detroit portion of the 
Detroit-Windsor tunnel and a 30-year lease for a parking garage located downtown. FGIC, for 
their part, received an option to develop the riverfront property site of the former Joe Louis 
hockey arena. These real estate and property agreements came with a number of development 
benefits for the city. Syncora must make $13 million in capital improvements to the garage, and 
that FGIC had to begin work on a “mixed-use” development within 36 months, covering the cost 
of all construction and onsite improvements.192 
Distributive Consequences of Financial Creditor Settlements  
By repeatedly demanding that Orr renegotiate to achieve a more favorable deal with 
BOA-ML and UBS, Rhodes redirected millions ($315 million, specifically) towards the city and 
its other creditors that would have otherwise gone to the banks. “Hasty and imprudent financial 
decision-making … [has] already caused great harm to the city's creditors and to its citizens” 
Rhodes told the courtroom after rejecting the second settlement, adding, “one goal of this 
Chapter 9 case is to end these practices so that the city can truly recover.”193 
It is more difficult to say how Detroit fared in these settlements compared to the 
alternative scenario in which the city decided to sue these financial creditors. On the one hand, 
the city gave up two substantial properties to the creditors in the settlements - the parking 
garage and the site of the hockey arena. James Doak, an expert from Miller Buckfire 
restructuring firm, testified during the bankruptcy approval hearings this particular garage 
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cleared only half a million dollars a year. Over 30 years, this represents $15 million in foregone 
revenues for the city.194 However, on net Detroit only lost about $2 million on the garage deal, 
given that Syncora will put about $13 million in capital improvements into the city-owned 
property. The cost of giving up the arena property also appears to have been low. Orr testified 
that this site had either no value or negative value because the costs of marketing the property - 
demolishing the arena structure and conducting environmental remediation - exceeded what the 
city could sell it for in the market.195 
Detroit also made a concession in extending Syncora’s tunnel lease in terms of not being 
able to competitively market the lease for an additional 20 years. This would represent a cost to 
the city if Syncora was not paying a competitive price. Yet, because the city had limited 
information on the financial and structural aspects of the tunnel - information that would be 
essential to market a lease - the answer to this question is unclear.196 Finally, by agreeing to 
these deals with FGIC and Syncora, Detroit gave up its opportunity to void the entirety of the 
COPs debt. The exact cost of this is unclear and depends upon the speculative probability of 
Detroit winning a lawsuit against the firms. 
The ways in which Detroit benefited from these deals are also unclear. The city will likely 
experience some tax revenue benefits from the FGIC development, though the exact size of these 
benefits is unknown at present. The city also avoided the legal fees that might have been 
involved in the lawsuits (and countersuits) between Detroit and these creditors. However, 
because it is impossible to determine these costs, this size of this benefit is similarly uncertain. 
In sum, it is difficult to perform a distributional analysis of the city’s deals with these 
creditors because the counterfactual comparison requires a number of imprecise speculations, 
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particularly regarding the cost and outcome of foregone litigation. In the next chapter, I will use 
the Orange County bankruptcy, which provides a real-life example of a municipality that sued 
financial firms outright, to add to this analysis. 
Professional Fees 
Before concluding this chapter, I will briefly address the role that consultants and 
attorneys hired to advise Detroit played in producing the outcomes discussed thus far. Detroit’s 
was not only the largest bankruptcy case in US history, but also the most expensive.197The city 
spent over $170 million on lawyer and restructuring fees, $164.91 million of which came from its 
general fund (the rest was funded by the State).198 Jones Day was Detroit’s most expensive 
professional service, receiving $57.9 million from the city. These fees represent a significant 
short-term stress on the city’s budget because they must be paid immediately.  
Given that these firms clearly benefited from the bankruptcy, it is important to consider 
the role they played in pushing officials to pursue this option for the city. Emails admitted as 
exhibits in the city’s eligibility hearing suggested that both Jones Day and Miller Buckfire 
offered gratuitous services to the state in the years leading up to the bankruptcy. Their 
recommendations during this time period included advice for how to pass a new emergency 
manager law that would be “referendum proof” and allow the city to enter bankruptcy.199  
When pressed on this issue during his testimony at the eligibility hearing, Governor 
Snyder himself speculated, “I perceived it as they were more presenting information to 
potentially get themselves hired for an engagement most likely … but not necessarily by the state 
or by the city. I'm not going to speculate on who.”200 These professional legal and consulting 
firms - particularly Jones Day - had a vested interest in the state’s pursuing a bankruptcy for 
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Detroit, and guided officials in that direction through the specific information and expertise they 
shared. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have analyzed the distributional consequences of this case as political 
outcomes in their own right. I have shown that not only was the very choice to file for 
bankruptcy a political one, but that the deals produced during the bankruptcy negotiations were 
reflections and consequences of individual and partisan agendas. In the next chapter, I will add 
to this analysis by comparing Detroit to two other local governments, New York City and Orange 
County, that experienced similar fiscal crises. Specifically, I ask: why did New York City receive 
federal and state bailouts when Detroit did not? Why did Orange County sue its financial 
lenders, but Detroit did not? And, did these variations result in different distributive outcomes 
between the three cases? 
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Chapter Five: Comparative Cases 
In the previous chapter I used counterfactuals to analyze the distributional implications 
of the Detroit bankruptcy. The two cases that I will now compare provide real-world illustrations 
of some of these counterfactual scenarios.201 New York City, which experienced an enormous 
fiscal crisis in the 1970s, is an example of a municipality that barely avoided bankruptcy in part 
because it received bailouts from New York State and, eventually, the federal government. The 
1994 Orange County bankruptcy, the third biggest in U.S. history, helps to illustrate Detroit’s 
treatment of the finance industry lenders. An examination of how these two cases resembled 
and differed from Detroit corroborates my distributional analysis in the previous chapter. These 
comparisons also begin my discussion of the broader significance of Detroit’s bankruptcy, which 
I will return to in my conclusion.  
New York City 
New York City’s Fiscal Crisis 
New York City experienced many of the same economic and demographic trends during 
the postwar decades as did Detroit and these placed similar strains on its budget. The city’s 
manufacturing sector, which had attracted waves of migrants to New York for more than a 
century, began to relocate to the suburbs and other regions of the United States. Unemployment 
increased steadily by 2% each year in the 1950s and then by 7% each year in the 1960s.202  The 
exodus of jobs from New York City also coincided with a growing demographic divide between 
city and suburban residents. From the 1950s through the 1970s, New York’s suburbs became 
increasingly middle class and white, while the city became comparatively poorer, with growing 
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black and Puerto Rican populations.203 As in Detroit, racially discriminatory zoning laws and 
FHA policies actively shaped these residential patterns. 
The concentration of rising unemployment and poverty in the city increased demand for 
social welfare expenditures at the same time as local revenues decreased. This trend was 
particularly acute for New York, as it provided a much larger share of social services to its 
citizens than was common nationally, among other cities.204 Further, because New York City was 
both a city and a county, funding for public services like hospitals and schools was contained to 
New York and not shared by other local communities.205  
New York City certainly possessed an advantage over Detroit in that it retained a large 
and varied economy despite deindustrialization. However, business leaders successfully 
pressured city politicians not to increase taxes on the private sector, warning that this would 
drive capital from the city.206 Mayor electoral coalitions, beginning with Robert Wagner in the 
1950s and 60s, became increasingly dependent on racial minorities, who pressed for more 
municipal services.207 This made it politically difficult for the city’s leaders to either reduce 
spending or increase taxes, even in the face of regular budget deficits.  
Instead, New York City officials fell into the pattern of borrowing to pay for current 
operating expenses. As the city’s budgetary shortfalls persisted year after year, it soon had to 
borrow to cover its debt payments as well. This strategy began to unravel when many of the 
banks that bought or insured New York’s bonds started to doubt the city’s ability to repay its 
debts. Having suffered significant losses during the early 1970s, firms on Wall Street and 
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elsewhere became less willing to risk lending to the city.208 By 1975, the banks had shut New 
York out of the securities market completely. Unable to borrow funds, the city had no way to 
cover its operating budget, yet alone the debt repayments that were about to come due. The city 
faced a cash flow shortfall of $12.96 billion in 1975.209 
State Bailout 
Though New York City’s fiscal crisis was considerably larger in magnitude than Detroit’s, 
the political context at the state level allowed for assistance to New York where it did not for 
Detroit. Perhaps the most crucial difference in state response was in the behavior of the two 
governors. Democratic New York Governor Hugh Carey quickly advanced New York City 
approximately $800 million so that it would not default on the debts that had to be repaid in 
April of 1975.210 Carey knew a New York City default would significantly impaired the state’s 
credit rating and thus viewed bankruptcy as a non-option.211 
Carey then created the Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC) to address the city’s 
crisis by retiring short-term debts and converting them to long-term obligations with lower 
interest rates. To encourage confidence from the banks, Carey extended the state’s credit to the 
MAC bonds. When July sales for these new bonds proved poor - largely because the banks 
believed New York had not reformed its unsustainable spending patterns - Carey took more 
drastic action to prevent the city from defaulting. 
In September, Carey proposed the omnibus Financial Emergency Act. Per this Act, the 
state took control of all budget operations in the city for the near future, under the auspices of 
the Financial Emergency Control Board (FECB). In exchange for cuts to New York City’s 
workforce and services, the state provided the city with $2.3 billion in aid.212 Union officials, 
recognizing that a bankruptcy would put their collective bargaining agreements with the city in 
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jeopardy, agreed to invest up to 40% of their pension fund assets in MAC bonds.213 Many of the 
city’s banks responded favorably to the FECB and began to purchase MAC bods as well.214 
Governor Carey’s efforts were not without political opposition from Republican factions 
of the New York State electorate and legislature who instead pushed for a New York City 
bankruptcy. According to Carey biographers Seymour Lachman and Robert Polner, many 
legislators upstate “made no secret of their distaste for the big city - a drain on the rest of the 
state, in their eyes - and who felt just as adamantly that Carey should force its leaders to finally 
feel the consequences of years of financial profligacy.”215 Republican state senate majority leader 
Warren Anderson opposed Carey’s proposal for an additional $200 million in state aid, saying 
that New York City leaders “must stop delivering more services than [they] can afford to give.”216 
Carey nonetheless worked to avoid bankruptcy, not only because it would have tested the 
state’s fiscal stability, but because the city’s municipal unions and voters were electorally vital 
for him. Carey received a substantial majority of city votes in the 1974 gubernatorial elections, as 
well an overwhelming endorsement from labor unions.217 For Carey, forcing the city to declare 
bankruptcy would have been, in the words of Lachman and Polner, “akin to cutting his own 
political throat.”218 The Democratic majority in the state assembly that supported Carey’s efforts 
in New York City shared his political allegiances.  
This was very different from Governor Snyder’s relationship with either Detroit’s 
electorate or public sector unions in Michigan, both of which were (and remain) key cogs in the 
state Democratic party. Where it was in Carey’s strategic interest to help New York City avoid 
bankruptcy, it was in Snyder’s interest to do the opposite for Detroit. The political differences 
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between New York State in 1975 and Michigan in 2013 led to markedly disparate state-level 
responses to these two municipal fiscal crises. 
In 1975, not only did New York City’s municipal unions have more political allies in the 
state government than did Detroit’s, but these organizations existed in an era that was generally 
more favorable to public sector unions. By 2013, Republicans had successfully challenged public 
sector unions in multiple states, as described in the previous chapter. The decline in private 
sector union density facilitated these attacks, as the shrinking of sympathetic, private sector 
union membership weakened electoral support for public sector unions.219 Mike Mulholland 
recalled that for years AFSCME leaders approached negotiations in Michigan expecting to fight 
against cuts rather than champion wage increases, asking themselves, “how bad is it going to be 
this time?”220 
Federal Bailout 
In the early months of New York City’s fiscal crisis, both Carey and Mayor Abe Beame 
unsuccessfully appealed to Republican President Gerald Ford to back the city’s bonds 
temporarily. This would have provided the city with short term relief, allowing it to re-enter the 
securities market before increasing local taxes for the next year. Ford responded that the city 
should find a way to help itself, preferably by reducing expenditures. In a public letter to Beame, 
the President wrote: 
A ninety day Federal guarantee by itself would provide no real solution [to the crisis] but 
would merely postpone, for that period, coming to grips with the problem. For a sound 
judgment to be made on this problem by all concerned, there must be presented a plan 
on how the City would balance its budget. This, given the amount involved to accomplish 
that balance, would require an evaluation of what the City can do through curtailment of 
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less essential services and subsidies and what activities the City can transfer under 
existing state laws to New York State.221 
Carey nonetheless redoubled his efforts to secure federal assistance when, in the fall of 1975, it 
became clear that the city would soon default on its debts despite the efforts of the MAC and 
FECM. Ford did not yield, instead vowing to veto any bailout to the city and proposed a new 
Chapter in federal bankruptcy code that would make it easier for the city to declare bankruptcy. 
In a speech the press summarized with the famous headline “Ford to City: Drop Dead,” the 
President chastised New York for “massive growth of the city’s debt [and] extraordinary 
increases in public employee contracts.”222 
Other conservative voices echoed Ford’s comments, naming labor power and social 
spending as the source of New York’s woes. The Wall Street Journal, for example, published an 
editorial piece in September of 1975 which argued, “the fiscal agony of New York has gone on so 
long that the only hope for a responsible and reasonably straightforward resolution is a 
voluntary bankruptcy … [the city] desperately needs a rearrangement of its debts and 
obligations, including labor contracts and pension plans.”223 In one meeting between city, state, 
and federal officials, Vice President Nelson Rockefeller pointed to New York State comptroller 
Arthur Levitt and suggested he bail out the city using money from the state’s pension funds.224 
These statements demonstrate why Republicans opposed bailouts for both New York 
City and Detroit. In both cases, conservatives argued that providing federal assistance would not 
address the structural issues facing the cities. And, in both cases, they named public sector 
employees - their contracts and their pensions - as a key source of fiscal instability. In New York 
City’s case, Republicans also lay blame on what they deemed to be overly generous social 
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spending, articulating a call for government downsizing that would become stronger still in the 
next decade.  
Had the political climate at the national level remained the same, New York City might 
have declared bankruptcy. As it was, domestic and foreign observers became increasingly wary 
of a New York City bankruptcy as the city inched closer and closer to default. West German 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt warned that New York City’s collapse would have “a domino effect, 
striking other world financial centers such as Zurich and Frankfurt.”225 A study by the Joint 
Economic Committee of Congress found that if the city defaulted, it would delay national 
recovery from the recent recession by increasing unemployment by 300,000 nationally and by 
reducing the gross national product by as much as 1% in 1976.226 In early November 1975, a 
Harris poll estimated 69% of the American public supported assistance for New York if it did not 
come at an expense to taxpayers outside the city.227  
The changing public sentiment towards New York made Ford’s hardline position on a 
bailout a political liability as he prepared to run against Jimmy Carter in the 1976 general 
election.228 This became all the more clear to Ford and others from the intensely negative 
reaction Ford received to the “Drop Dead” headline.229 By November 26, 1975, Ford acquiesced 
and called on Congress to approve new legislation giving New York City $2.3 billion in direct 
federal loans.230  
 Though public opinion forced Ford to concede on the issue of a federal assistance, he was 
nevertheless able to use the bailout as an opportunity to force a more fiscally conservative 
budget on New York City. As a condition to the bailout, the city accepted significant 
retrenchment in the form of labor cuts, increased fees for city services, fewer low rent housing 
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subsidies, and the elimination of free higher education at the city’s public universities.231 Thus, 
Ford was able to appease his conservative constituencies on the issue of ‘profligate’ social 
spending, even as he altered course on the bailout. 
 Detroit experienced no such political turnaround at the national level, largely because 
neither public opinion nor public spending provided opportunities for compromise with 
Republicans. Detroit certainly never occupied New York’s position as an international economic 
and financial center. However, even in the 1970s, Detroit had significantly more national 
influence than it had by 2013.232 When asked if the Obama administration was concerned about 
the effects that Detroit’s bankruptcy could have on the national economy, Press Secretary Jay 
Carney responded, “I don't have anything concrete to say about that. We're concerned, 
obviously, about the citizens of Detroit.”233 International observers were even less perturbed 
about the potential spillover effects of the bankruptcy, as they had virtually no economic stakes 
in the city’s financial stability. 
 Similarly, Detroit could not realistically offer spending cuts as a concession to 
Republicans in return for federal aid because, in short, there was almost nothing left to cut. For 
comparison, in 1975, New York’s labor costs were $889 per capita and its total spending $346 
per capita, whereas Detroit spent only $346 per capita on labor and $370 per capita on all public 
expenditures.234 Detroit’s spending continued to decline after the 1970s, until its city services 
sunk to the level of dysfunction and deprivation described in previous chapters. In the Detroit 
case, Republican officials focused primarily on the issue of retiree benefits, which could only be 
addressed through bankruptcy. 
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 Because New York City managed to avoid bankruptcy, its municipal unions were able to 
preserve the institution of collective bargaining and protect the principle that contractual gains 
and retirement obligations were inviolable. Though these unions did concede to state and 
federally mandated austerity measures, they were able to regain many benefits during 
subsequent negotiations in the late 1970s and early 1980s.235 In Detroit, not only did retirees 
lose billions of dollars in retirement benefits, but conditions attached to the bankruptcy 
settlement hamstrung organized labor in Michigan from preventing future challenges to 
collective bargaining.  
Orange County 
Orange County’s Fiscal Crisis 
In the mid-to-late twentieth century, Orange County, California experienced the inverse 
trajectory of urban areas like Detroit and New York City. The County grew rapidly from 
suburbanization in these years, gaining 2 million residents between 1940 and 1990.236 The local 
economy expanded considerably beginning in the 1980s, with employment growth outpacing 
the population at times. The median household income in Orange County was $46,000 in 1994, 
more than 50% above the national average at that time.237 
Mark Baldassare argues that Orange County “was not the usual bankruptcy scenario of a 
troubled central city with declining revenues and rising expenditures … [the county’s] downfall 
was the result of an overwhelming desire to live beyond their means by increasing their local 
revenues.”238 Notably, this increase in local revenue that Baldassare refers to here did not come 
from taxes, but from risky financial speculation.  
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Orange County’s political environment included a fiscally conservative electorate and a 
Republican-dominated local government whose politicians ran on platforms of maintaining 
middle-class services without raising taxes.239 When a regional recession in the early 1990s led 
to a slight decline in local revenue, officials sought to compensate for the county’s losses without 
compromising on taxes or services. Orange County treasurer Robert Citron provided the county 
with a way to do just this. Citron first used the funds in the Orange County Investment Pool, 
about $7.6 billion in contributions from local governments and districts, as collateral to borrow 
an additional $13 billion from Wall Street firms.240 He then used the combined funds to invest in 
derivatives and other exotic and unstable financial instruments.   
 This is where Orange County’s experience began to overlap with Detroit’s - in the use of 
risky financial techniques to circumvent barriers in the local budget.241 Citron relied heavily on 
floating interest securities, which, much like Detroit’s swaps deal, effectively bet on the direction 
of interest rates.242 His strategy worked well when interest rates were low, decreasing the 
investment pool’s total debts and increasing the value of its long term investments. In the early 
1990s, when interest rates were indeed low, the Orange County Investment Pool generated 
interest payments that grew local revenues without increasing taxes. But when the Federal 
Reserve increased interest rates in 1994, Citron’s entire system began to collapse.  
Baldassare attributes the crisis in part to the “weak” structure of Orange County’s 
government, which allowed elected officials like Citron limited oversight but significant 
autonomy.243 The county’s Board of Supervisors, auditor-controller, and other administrators 
had little knowledge of the specifics of Citron’s risky financial techniques. Indeed, the crisis first 
came to light only because local business leaders urged elected officials to look into the rumors 
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they heard from Wall Street of the county’s collapse. In November of 1994, the County 
commissioned an independent evaluation of the investment pool by an outside consultant who 
reported a $1.5 billion loss on investments.244 
Local officials quickly assembled a “crisis team” to address the situation. It first sought 
loans from Wall Street investors to cover the pool’s losses, but investors refused to offer the 
county assistance. The team then tried to liquidate the pool’s risky investments, but found no 
buyers. As a last resort, county officials asked the Securities and Exchange Commission to freeze 
the investment pool, but the commission denied their request. On December 6, 1994, the first 
bank seized on the collateral it held in the investment pool.245 The county Board of Supervisors 
filed for bankruptcy hours later, in a strategic effort to prevent a run on the $7.6 billion in local 
funds held as collateral by the banks. 
 Less than a month passed between when county leaders received official reports on the 
magnitude of the county’s losses and when they declared bankruptcy. This left precious little 
time for the county to appeal to higher levels of government for assistance. The weak, 
decentralized nature of Orange County’s government made organizing for this task even more 
difficult. In an investigation on the bankruptcy by California’s State Senate Special Committee 
on Local Government Interventions, county leaders and state officials pointed fingers at one 
another for failing to respond to the crisis in time.246 
Bankruptcy 
 There are many dissimilarities in how Orange County and Detroit each arrived at 
bankruptcy, from the source and pace of the fiscal crisis to the role of the state government. As 
mentioned, what is common to both cases is the use of complex financial mechanisms to 
maneuver around state-imposed limits on borrowing. However, the treatment of these financial 
services firms was notably different in Orange County’s bankruptcy. Unlike Detroit, Orange 
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County did not treat these firms as creditors, but instead sued them to help repay local 
government investors in the Orange County Investment Pool.  
 After an early settlement fell through in June of 1995, members of the Orange County 
Business Council, lawyers, and officials negotiated a new Plan of Adjustment. This time, pool 
participants would no longer hold the county responsible for the $861 million it still owed them 
after the liquidation of pool assets.247 Instead, they would remove this debt from Orange County 
and wait for the repayment of their funds through lawsuits against Wall Street firms. The local 
government creditors approved this plan, and Orange County emerged from bankruptcy on July 
12, 1996. 
By February of 2000, Orange County had won a number of these lawsuits and disbursed 
$865 million in settlements to the local government creditor.248 This included a $400 million 
settlement from Merrill Lynch (BOA-ML), the division of Bank of America involved in Detroit’s 
swaps deal.249 In the early 1990s, BOA-ML sold Citron roughly two-thirds of the securities used 
to grow the investment pool. Orange County claimed that because Citron had no right to enter 
into these agreements, as they exceeded the municipal debt level set by the California 
constitution, BOA-ML should be held responsible for any losses it incurred on so-called “reverse 
repayment” agreements.  
In addition to suing the banks that provided Citron with risky securities, Orange County 
also took action against a number of firms that contributed to the county’s fiscal crisis in other 
ways, The county won a $45 settlement from against the law firm that served as Citron’s bond 
advisor, a $75 million settlement from the auditing firm KPMG for failing to warn the county of 
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its risky investments, and a $140,000 settlement against Standard and Poor’s for “erroneous 
evaluation” of the county’s credit rating.250 
Thus, Orange County provides an example of what might have happened in the Detroit 
bankruptcy had Orr and the city’s legal advisors decided to sue certain firms outright instead of 
treating them as creditors. Syncora, FGIC, BOA-ML, and UBS all held claims that Judge Rhodes 
deemed legally questionable based on the same argument that Orange County used to sue BOA-
ML and others: that their involvement in municipal finances was illegal because it allowed local 
officials to subvert state imposed limits on borrowing. However, Orr and his legal team 
nonetheless treated these firms as creditors throughout the bankruptcy process, from the 
Proposal to Creditors to the Plan of Adjustment.  
The discrepancy in the treatment of financial services firms in these two cases is 
especially curious considering that the same attorney, Bruce Bennett, served as chief legal 
counsel to both Detroit and Orange County. In 1995, the New York Times published a profile 
calling Bennett “Orange County’s artful dodger,” describing his many “bold moves” in the 
case.251  The Times noted in particular that Bennett shocked many in the financial community by 
questioning whether securities (like COPs or interest swaps) should be treated like bonds. 
Bennett became a partner at Jones Day in 2012, and by the time he came to represent Detroit in 
2013, he had apparently lost much of his desire to “shake up the municipal bond market.”252 
 It is unclear why Bennett, Orr, and Detroit’s other advisors did not follow the precedent 
set by Orange County in their treatment of finance firms. Joseph Fichera, a Wall Street financial 
advisor, noted that between 1994 and 2014, “most advisors and bankers have persuaded 
governments that the market would penalize them if they sued a banker.”253 Others have alleged 
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that Jones Day’s representation of Detroit represented a conflict of interest, in that some of 
Detroit’s financial lenders, including BOA-ML and UBS, were also its clients.254  
Whatever the reason, Detroit’s decision to treat these firms as creditors likely cost the 
city millions. According to the final Plan of Adjustment, Detroit repaid these creditors 13-24% of 
their claims and offered additional sweeteners to secure settlements (upwards of $270 million, 
in total). Orange County, on the other hand, extracted multi-million dollar settlements without 
any conciliatory payments to the firms.  
This decision was largely justified as an alternative to litigation by the fact that Detroit 
avoided the legal fees associated with potential lawsuits. Though not a perfect comparison, 
Orange County paid its attorneys less than $50 million to litigate the county’s numerous  
suits.255 Adjusted for inflation, this is approximately the same amount the City of Detroit paid 
Jones Day for its services during the bankruptcy. This amount is also less than the $270 million 
Detroit paid to Syncora, FGIC, BOA-ML, and UBS. Though comparisons between these two 
cases on this issue are largely speculative, it appears that by taking more aggressive action 
against its financial creditors (and hiring less expensive legal counsel) Detroit might have 
avoided paying these firms millions in taxpayer money and city property.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I compared Detroit to two other distressed local governments in recent 
history to test the robustness of my distributional analysis of Detroit’s bankruptcy in chapter 4. I 
used cases that were significantly similar to Detroit, yet differed along certain key conditions 
discussed in chapter 4, to demonstrate that these variables produced disparate outcomes. New 
York City faced a larger fiscal crisis than Detroit’s, but in a different political context. The fact 
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that New York received multiple bailouts further supports my argument from chapter 4 that 
Detroit’s bankruptcy was a political outcome and not an inevitable result of its fiscal crisis. 
Orange County and Detroit engaged in the same risky financial wagers, yet Orange County 
extracted significantly more money from the financial services firms who facilitated those 
gambles. This difference adds to my previous analysis of Detroit’s bankruptcy settlements, 
suggesting that the city may have been better off had it sued those financial firms outright. The 
Orange County case also serves to emphasize my point that Detroit’s attorneys and consultants 
exerted considerable influence over the outcome of the bankruptcy. 
Finally, comparisons between Detroit and both New York City and Orange County 
demonstrate the shifting political and economic climate of the U.S. As discussed at different 
points in this chapter, after the 1970s and even the 1990s, public and private sector unionism 
weakened across the country as the influence of the financial sector grew. This period effect 
contributed to distributive outcomes that disadvantaged retirees and Detroiters. Governor Carey 
foreshadowed this shift when he warned Ford that if he allowed New York to go bankrupt, 
“every municipality in this … nation will become vulnerable to this political/financial pincer and 
more and more, New York City and other cities will have public and social policy decided in 
bank boardrooms.”256 
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Conclusion 
In the final days of the bankruptcy trial, Judge Rhodes allowed Estella Ball, a Detroit 
retiree, to present her personal objection to the Plan of Adjustment. Speaking before the court, 
she argued: 
Now, through [the bankruptcy] process, Governor Snyder and Mr. Orr wish to negate all 
of [the pensioners’] hard work and earned benefits by blaming the city for the failure of 
the country, the state, and the schemes of the financial institutions and the lawyers who 
set up the schemings. Now they want to put it on the backs of the retirees, ignoring and 
rewriting city laws, state laws, and the Constitution of the United States in an 
unprecedent[ed] grab of power by the State of Michigan officials. If they do it to us in 
Detroit, they will do it to anyone in this country.257 
Ms. Ball’s eloquent statement captures two aspects of Detroit’s bankruptcy that I will discuss in 
my conclusion. The first is the issue of distributive justice. In Chapters 4 and 5, I found that 
Detroit’s bankruptcy largely shifted the cost of addressing the city’s fiscal crisis onto Detroit 
retirees and residents. Now that I have established “who paid,” I turn to the question of who 
should have paid. 
As I alluded to in my introduction, Detroit’s decline is often discussed as having an aura 
of economic inevitability. However, Chapter 2 demonstrated that government and group actions 
were largely responsible for the city’s downturn. Mid-century policies at the federal and local 
levels intentionally created racial segregation in the metro-Detroit area and lay the foundation 
for Detroit’s economic and fiscal crisis. More recently, the State of Michigan exacerbated 
Detroit’s budgetary challenges by cutting revenue sharing to the city, weakening a redistributive 
mechanism that had provided Detroit with access to capital just beyond city limits. These cuts 
effectively pulled the rug out from under the feet of city officials as they tried to maintain fiscal 
stability. Perhaps the final blow came from Wall Street, which took advantage of Detroit’s 
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vulnerability by peddling highly risky financial mechanisms to a city that desperately needed 
revenue and could not afford to say no.  
All of these entities - from Lansing to Wall Street - should have borne their share of 
addressing a crisis they helped to create by draining the city of its resources. Yet, Republicans 
shifted much of the blame for the fiscal crisis onto Detroit residents and retirees. They labeled 
Detroit a burden to the state’s finances and chastised municipal retirees for their ‘overly 
generous’ pensions and benefits. And so these groups came to pay for a crisis they had, for the 
most part, played little role in creating. 
This is troubling not only because it seems profoundly unfair, but also because Detroit’s 
retired employees and residents were not, by and large, well-off to begin with. In the 
bankruptcy, many pensioners had to give up significant portions of their already small annual 
incomes - money they had earned through years of work and on which they had come to rely. 
Aging retirees have seen their healthcare benefits drastically reduced at a time when their 
medical costs are likely increasing. Further, resources that Detroit could have used for much-
needed improvements to city services will instead go to the city’s predatory Wall Street lenders 
and to the lawyers and consultants who profited considerably from steering the city into 
bankruptcy. For these reasons, I believe that Detroit’s bankruptcy resulted in an unjust 
distribution of the city’s resources. 
The second concern that Ball’s statement raises is: what does Detroit’s bankruptcy mean 
for the rest of Michigan and for the nation? Eleven other cities in Michigan are already under 
emergency management, and the agreements reached in Detroit’s bankruptcy will most likely 
make it easier for the state to continue to use these managers to push Republicans’ fiscal and 
political agenda on these and other cities.  
On a national level, many local governments in the U.S. are struggling to maintain fiscal 
stability, especially in the wake of the Great Recession. Public sector retiree obligations have 
received particular attention for this issue, often targeted as unwieldy burdens that local and 
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state governments must shed. Although the use of Chapter 9 is limited by state authorization 
and eligibility requirements, neither should be viewed as absolute. Both federal bankruptcy code 
and state authorization statutes have been and could continue to be adjusted by elected officials. 
The variability of public bankruptcy in the U.S. is perhaps best demonstrated by the current 
debate over whether states should be allowed to go bankrupt. It is therefore certainly possible 
that bankruptcy will become an increasingly common phenomenon among local and even state 
governments. 
Finally, I believe that Detroit’s bankruptcy represents a new age of local government in 
the U.S. which reflects the current dynamics of American inequality, particularly the decline of 
labor power and the rise of the financial sector’s influence. The Detroit case demonstrates that 
local government fiscal policy and bankruptcy represent yet another arena in which the 
country’s wealthy elite may take advantage of the poor and working class. In this context, the 
saying “so goes Detroit, so goes the nation” takes on a disturbing meaning in Ms. Ball’s final 
warning: “If they do it to us in Detroit, they will do it to anyone in this country.”
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Appendix A: City of Detroit Bankruptcy Timeline  
May 15, 1990 - Michigan’s original emergency management law effective 
March 16, 2011 - Public Act 4 expands emergency manager powers 
November 10, 2011 - Snyder appoints financial review commission for Detroit 
April 4, 2012 - Detroit officials approve a “Financial Stability Agreement” with the state 
November 7, 2012 - Voters repeal Public Act 4 
December 28, 2012 - Snyder approves Public Act 436 
March 14, 2013 - Orr is appointed emergency manager of Detroit 
July 18, 2013 - Orr files for bankruptcy on behalf of Detroit 
August 2013 - Christie’s Appraisals assesses value of DIA artwork 
December 3, 2013 - Rhodes rules Detroit eligible for bankruptcy 
January 13, 2014 - Rosen announces his plan for the “grand bargain”  
February 21, 2014 - City proposes an initial version of its “Plan of Adjustment” 
April 8, 2014 - City settles with UTGO insurance companies 
April 11, 2014 - Rhodes approves $85 million settlement with Bank of America and UBS 
April 25, 2014 - Retiree committee agrees to support revised Plan of Adjustment 
May 21, 2014 - UAW agrees to raise funds to help offset retiree health care cuts 
September 2, 2014 - Plan of Adjustment confirmation trial begins 
September 9, 2014 - City and surrounding counties announce GLWA deal 
September 15, 2014 - Syncora settles with the city 
October 16, 2014 - FGIC settles with the city 
November 7, 2014 - Rhodes approves the Eighth Amended Plan of Adjustment 
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Appendix B: City of Detroit Bankruptcy Claims and Treatments 
Class Name Claim* Treatment 
Secured Claims 
1A-C All DWSD Bond Claims $5,830 Unimpaired 
2A-F Secured General Obligation 
Bonds, 2010-2012 
$485 Unimpaired 
3-4,6 Other Secured Claims $95.8 Unimpaired 
5 COP Swap Claims $343.6 $85 million 
Unsecured Claims 
7 Limited Tax General Obligation 
Bond Claims 
$163.5 41% recovery 
8 Unlimited Tax General 
Obligation Bond Claims 
$388 74% recovery 
9 COP Claims $1,430 - FGIC: 13% recovery, real estate 
- Syncora: 13% recovery, real estate, tunnel lease 
10 PFRS Pension Claims $1,660 - No reduction in accrued pension benefit amount 
- 45% reduction in COLA 
11 GRS Pension Claims $1,700 - 4.5% reduction in accrued pension benefit amount 
- Elimination of COLA 
- “Clawback” on annuities ($387 million) 
12 OPEB Claims $5,700 $4.3 billion: $2.2 billion for PRFS retirees and $2.1 
billion for GRS retirees. 
13 Downtown Development 
Authority Claims 
$33.6 $3.69 million 
14 Other Unsecured Claims -- $16.48 million 
15 Convenience Claims -- 25% recovery 
16 Subordinated Claims -- 0% recovery 
17 Indirect 36th District Court 
Claims 
$6 33% recovery 
 
* In millions 
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